

Thesis

**Revolutionary ideology: A Quantitative Study on the Transformational Effect of Ideology
in Revolutions**

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Abstract

Why do some revolutions transform society while others fail to produce lasting institutional change? This paper argues that one shortcoming in the theoretical advancement of revolutionary theory lies in the absence of neutral-transformation criteria that provide analytical utility for comparatively studying revolutions. This paper proposes education curriculum change as one such measure that is ideologically neutral and comparable across different types of revolutions. Specifically, it acts as an indicator of the Ideological State Apparatus identified by Althusser. Drawing on revolutionary theory, critical juncture theory, and Bayat, this paper seeks to bridge the gap in revolutionary theory by advancing revolutionary ideology as an explanatory factor of transformation within the educational curriculum. Using Beissinger's revolutionary dataset and V-Dem curriculum measures, the paper analyses 134 revolutionary episodes between 1952 and 2014 through cross-national regression models. The results indicate that revolutionary ideology significantly predicts curriculum transformation, but only when revolutionaries take power. Conditional on regime change, Leftist and Democratic revolutionary ideologies exhibit positive effects on curriculum transformation. Islamist revolutionary ideology shows the same pattern, though the sample contains only six such episodes. Lastly, Ethnic revolutionary ideology exhibits no robust relationship with curriculum transformation. The findings suggest that the transformational effect observed may not necessarily be explained by ideological content as much as ideological depth, coherence, and the willingness of revolutionaries to compete for power. Broadly, this study advances curriculum transformation as a long-term outcome measure through which revolutionary change can be assessed.

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Introduction

The French revolution of 1789 is often hailed as a hallmark for the spread of liberal democracy and popular sovereignty. It redefined the social contract many states embody today. Yet undeniably, it entailed revolutionary horrors and resulted in political reversion when Napoleon crowned himself emperor in 1804. In a similar fashion, the Arab Spring encompassed democratic ideals and to some extent adhered to non-violence, yet resulted in counter-revolutions (e.g., Clarke, 2023) or civil war. However, the former represents societal transformation, while the latter is associated with dark horrors and collapse. What makes some revolutions transformative and others not, despite sharing similar poor short-term outcomes?

One of the key elements to the paradox above is a non-consistent standard for evaluating revolutions. If analysis on the French Revolution confined itself to Napoleonic reversion, it would be considered a failed revolution overall. Yet, recent revolutions are often evaluated by such short-term measures that highlight their destructive nature as opposed to their potential generative aspect. The Arab Spring represented a nuanced form of revolutions in which regime change was achieved, but transformation was shallow, leaving some regimes vulnerable to counter-revolutions (e.g., Allinson, 2019, Clarke, 2023). Evidently, one way to resolve the paradox above is to develop a framework by which to compare historical and contemporary revolutions.

This approach does not come without its challenges. Earlier scholars of revolutions emphasised radical transformation as a key criterion for an event to qualify as a revolution. Structural theories argue that factors relating to class and state structures collide to result in a transformative revolution (e.g., Skocpol, 1979; Moore, 1966). Others argue that revolutions arise when institutional development lags behind economic modernisation (e.g., Huntington 1968).

Hence, they view class transformation or institutional developments as their primary criteria for a successful revolution. As scholarship evolved, revolutions began to be studied as attempts at transformation. In these studies, revolutionary processes were emphasised in analysis as opposed to the pre-conditions that predict revolutionary success. These perspectives elevated the role of agency over structural factors. Their criteria for success vary, ranging from short-term regime change to long term democratisation trends (e.g., Dahlum, 2023) or economic progress. As will be elaborated in the literature review, earlier theories employ a rigid criterion for revolutions that makes it difficult to study modern day revolutions, while subsequent scholarship lacks an established benchmark by which to evaluate revolutions.

In order to attempt the paradox presented in this paper, the theoretical framework synthesises work on revolutions, critical junctures, and ideology to bridge the gap of aforementioned generations of revolutionary theory. By doing so, it preserves the core tenets of structural transformation while incorporating agency-centric explanations that focus on the process of revolutions. To establish a neutral and measurable indicator of transformation, this framework utilises the role of the state's educational curriculum. Curriculum change serves as one important indicator of transformation in the Ideological State Apparatus (ISA): a mechanism guarded by path dependency, yet vital to alter if a revolution is to achieve lasting transformation.

Once this measure is established, this paper advances revolutionary ideology as a central variable to explain transformation. Ideology remains an under-utilised variable in quantitative analyses of long-term revolutionary transformation. Thus, this paper addresses the following research question: To what extent does revolutionary ideology shape educational curriculum transformation following a revolutionary episode?

The theoretical framework expects that Leftist and Islamist revolutionary ideologies, by virtue of their substantive nature, will predict greater transformational effect on education than Democratic and Ethnic revolutions, which are more procedural. This framework posits that regime change may serve as a moderating variable by which to achieve such transformation, rather than an end-goal.

The paper's empirical contribution lies in quantitatively analysing the effect of revolutionary ideology on educational curriculum content seven years after a revolutionary episode. This timeline acts as a medium to long term success measure that overcomes shortcomings associated with short-term evaluations of revolutionary success, while remaining narrow enough to allow for causal inference. The study employs an OLS regression on a large-N sample consisting of 134 revolutionary episodes between 1952 and 2014 from Beissinger's (2022a) revolutionary dataset, utilising outcome measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem; 2026) dataset.

This paper aims to help shape the emerging fifth generation of revolutionary theory by introducing neutral, objective measures of success, while advancing agency-centric explanations that take into account structural factors. The paper finds that revolutionary ideology heavily dictates the trajectory of revolutions as critical junctures that affect educational curriculum change, yielding heterogeneous observations. Crucially, this effect is entirely moderated by regime change, meaning that revolutionary ideology only transforms the curriculum when revolutionaries achieve power. Most notably, Leftist revolutionary ideology - conditional on regime change, predicts the highest degree of transformation in the educational curricula, followed by Islamist then Democratic revolutionary ideologies. Ethnic revolutionary ideology showed no significant effect on the curriculum. The constant significance of the Democratic

revolutionary ideology hypothesis implies that revolutionary ideology's predictive power may rely less on the substantive nature of its content and more on its depth or coherence.

Consequently, future research could categorise revolutions based on their ideological depth to further explicate this mechanism and enrich our understanding of revolutionary ideologies and outcomes.

What follows is a literature review tracing the evolution of revolutionary theory, highlighting the gap included in educational measures of revolutionary outcomes. The theoretical framework stems from this gap in an attempt to conceptualise revolutionary success and explain the mechanism and expected hypotheses in the analysis. The following methodology section outlines the research design and variables used throughout the analysis. The results section reports the key findings, while the discussion following it conceptualises the analysis and discusses its implications, limitations, and directions for future research. The conclusion ends with a summary and final remarks.

Literature Review

Revolutionary theory has evolved throughout the years. As subsequent iterations change the field, so do the criteria for success and what qualifies as a revolutionary episode to be studied. Scholars have identified distinct patterns common to a group of authors analysing a similar subset of revolutions. These patterns represent the mode of thinking about revolutions and have been classified as generational theory. This review summarises how earlier generations understood revolutions. It then introduces recent approaches and the limitations associated with them, most notably the stagnation of theoretical advancement due to a narrow lens. It then discusses the apparent emergence of the fifth generation of revolutionary theory, identifying

long-term transformations in the education system as a gap in the literature. Briefly, it transitions to the theoretical framework, arguing ideology is a useful explanatory variable.

Early scholarship analyses revolutions from a set of natural causes. Goldstone (1982) identifies the general pattern laid by the first generation of revolutionary theory (e.g., Edwards, 1927; Brinton, 1938; Pettie, 1966), which finds that great revolutions are often initiated by the intellectual class abandoning and openly criticising the ruling regimes. States granting concession tend to encourage more dissent. In combination with overblown crises, revolutions emerge and break down state institutions. Following regime overthrow, radical elements often take power and implement their ideology. Eventually, as the revolution fervour fades, they are forced to give way to pragmatic leadership (Goldstone, 1982). George Pettie (1966) defines success as the overthrow and complete change of the purpose and institutions of the state: “the organisation of society under the force of one purpose... dissolves and is replaced by another,” (Pettie, 1966, p. 3)

The second generation of revolutionary theory sought to focus on the causes of revolutions instead, rather than explaining their stages. Authors of this stage (e.g., Davies, 1962; Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1968) argued that revolutions are caused by the aggregate frustration or actions of individuals (Goldstone, 1982; Bayat, 2021). They view revolutions as an innate part of the state and its institutions. For example, Huntington (1968) claims revolutions occur when economic progress outpaces political modernisation. He argues successful revolutions act as a correction mechanism that combine “rapid political mobilisation and rapid political institutionalisation,” to modernise the state (Huntington, 1968, p. 266).

The third generation of revolutionary theory emerged as a response to the aforementioned authors. This wave argued that structural factors explained the causes and successes of

revolutions. Theda Skocpol's (1979) foundational work, *States and Social Revolutions*, conducts a comparative historical analysis of the French, Chinese, and Russian revolutions. She defines social revolutions as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures," (p. 4) that enables countries to grow and outpace their former power and autonomy. Political revolutions such as rebellions or regime overthrow transform the state structure, while processes such as the industrialisation transform the social structure. What distinguishes social revolutions is the simultaneous transformation of both state and class structure (Skocpol, 1979). As such, under this framework revolutionary success is understood as change in the modes of production, class relations, and the dominance of new political and ideological ideas (Skocpol, 1979). This focus on class relations is shared with Moore (1966). For example, he (1966) argues that the land enclosure policies in England created the incentive for a bourgeoisie revolution which increase the power of parliament at the expense of the monarchy, hence leading to a constitutional monarchy.

Common to this work thus far, is a strict adherence to what constitutes a revolution, and tendency to study a narrow set of landmark cases, such as the English, French, Russian, and Chinese revolution, all of which fit the criteria for radical transformation (e.g., Brinton, 1938; Skocpol, 1979; Moore, 1966). As late twentieth century revolutionary episodes multiplied and diverged from these cases, however, these approaches proved difficult to apply. The fourth generation of revolutionary theory emerged with an expanded definition of revolutions that was able to fit in those cases, which allowed a large array of revolutions to be studied as a result (Korotayev, Grinin, et al., 2025). Goldstone's (2001) definition illustrates this point as he defines revolutions as, "an effort to transform the political institutions and the justification for political

authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilisation and non-institutionalised actions that undermine existing authorities,” (p. 142).

A key differentiator of this wave is its emphasis on agency-centred explanations and revolutionary processes, rather than structural causes of revolutions. It adopted multi-causal approaches to understand revolutionary processes (Bayat, 2021). Scholars increasingly incorporated agency-centred variables such as ideology (e.g., Selbin, 2010), leadership (Wickham-Crowley, 1992), collective identities (e.g., Wood, 2006), and tactical choices (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). For example, Selbin (2010) argues that revolutions can only be understood through the narratives and ideological visions by which revolutionaries interpret reality and mobilise support. Similarly, Wickham-Crowley (1992) showcases how differences in leadership and organisational structure lead to divergent outcomes, despite shared structural conditions. Authors in this wave focused on explaining revolutionary processes, rather than establishing a common benchmark for revolutionary success. As such, studies differed in their outcome of interest, with some focusing on regime change, and others on regime durability, cultural transformation, or democratisation. In focusing on the process of revolutions, however, the field theoretically stagnated. The Arab Spring and ensuing debate of a new generation of revolutionary theory expose this tension clearly.

The Arab Spring presented a new wave of revolutions that led to disparate outcomes, with some resulting in regime change that left them vulnerable to counter-revolutions, while others led to civil war. Bayat’s (2017) work, *Revolution without Revolutionaries*, provides a thorough analysis of the Arab Spring. He claims that the Arab Spring movements lacked a prognostic framing for the problems it identified. Moreover, unlike past revolutions, they were leaderless, horizontal movements that sought reform over revolt. They did not seek to take

power, rather they arose as movements to force the regime to reform itself (Bayat, 2017). Bayat (2021) argues that the Arab Spring represents a new type of revolutions that are “rich as movements, but poor in terms of change,” (p. 397). In their wake, the status quo is maintained rather than transformed.

It is in this spirit that Allinson (2019) characterises Bayat’s (2017) work, among others, as part of a fifth generation of revolutionary theory, claiming this wave has come and passed. Core to his critique is that the Arab Spring does not depart from earlier revolutions. Instead, they present revolutions that failed or resulted in negotiated settlements¹. That said, Allinson (2019) argues that the Arab Spring introduce a new causal story of successful counter-revolutions to be studied instead. Abrams (2019) rejects Allinson’s (2019) claims that a fifth generation has even arrived, let alone passed. Abrams (2019) argues these works fall under the vast literature of the fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Both authors, however, contend that the fourth generation of revolutionary theory has theoretically stagnated.

Abrams (2019) argues that the field’s mutli-causal and complex modelling has vastly enriched our understanding of revolutionary episodes in themselves, but this has come at the cost of theoretical advancement. Abrams (2019) and Korotayev, Grinin, et al. (2025) draw examples from earlier generations of revolutionary theory to illustrate the utility of bold theorising. Abrams (2019) argues that the earlier generations focus in advancing the primacy of certain causes over others contributed to a richer understanding of revolutions overall. As Beck (2018) similarly summarises, the field’s comparative analysis methodologies tend to study similar

¹ In fact, Bayat (2021) responds to Allinson’s (2019) critique emphasizing that the leaderless and horizontal nature of the Arab Spring disbar them from being qualified as negotiated settlements. Instead, he insists they were unique in being rich as movements yet shallow in transformation.

subset of revolutions. This means that grand theories of revolution cannot be established nor are even attempted.

While the challenges identified are yet to be surmounted, Korotayev, Fain, et al. (2025) argue that a fifth generation of revolutionary theory is manifesting itself in work such as Beissinger (2022b), Dahlum (2023), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and Mako and Moghadam (2021). Methodologically, this new generation is increasingly focused on quantitative measures and global datasets (Korotayev, Fain, et al., 2025). Beck (2017) optimistically anticipates a shift in revolutionary studies from comparative historical analyses to large N-model to help infer causality. A theme emerging within this literature is a focus on why some revolutions succeed while others fail. Despite a limited definition of success as regime overthrow, Korotayev, Fain, et al. (2025) note an increasing shift towards analysing revolutions as open historical processes that must be understood in the long-term.

For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that non-violent campaigns significantly increase the likelihood of a revolution succeeding. They define success as achieving states policy outcomes within two years of a revolution. Moreover, Dahlum (2023) finds that the broader the coalitions of social groups in an unarmed revolutions is, the more positive its democratisation effect seven years after a revolution. Mako and Moghadam (2021) study the Arab Spring revolutions. They (2021) find that the presence of an active civil society and women mobilisation were key factors that helped lead to more democratisation in Tunisia and Morocco.

Beissinger (2022b) traces the nature of urban and rural revolutions, arguing that today most revolutions stem from cities and often employ non-violent means of mobilisation which increase their chances of regime overthrow. In the latter part of his book, he analyses various revolutionary outcomes. He (2022) employs a difference-in-differences design analysing

revolutionary outcomes seven years post a revolution. He compares pre and post-revolutionary means within countries and against non-revolutionary countries. Overall, he finds that social (leftist) revolutions have a negative impact on the economy and political freedom, but a positive effect on equality, providing order, and regime durability. Urban-civic revolutions (urban-based, non-violent movements) on the other hand, increase civil liberties but are often fragile and reach a stagnating point in the economy. Beissinger (2022b) explains this as a mechanism of urban-civic revolutions having minimalist goals. Their success often entails inheriting the old regime rather than transforming it. This is not far from Bayat's (2017) diagnosis of the Arab Spring's failure. Moreover, this is echoed by Clarke's (2023) analysis of counterrevolutionary success. He (2023) finds that violent revolutions tend to be less vulnerable to counter-revolutions since they tend to have their own army. This, however, comes at the expense of political freedoms. Non-violent revolutions, on the other hand, are associated with the positive characteristics Beissinger (2022b) identified but are vulnerable to counter-revolutions.

The direction of this new generation is substantially improving our understanding of revolutionary outcomes. Rather than focusing on structures or processes alone, this wave distinguishes itself by its focus on evaluating long-term outcomes as exemplified in the work above. Despite these advances, studies continue to rely on regime change, consolidation, democratisation, or economic outcomes to assess revolutions. A common thread emerging from both generations' critiques is the absence of comparable outcome measures for revolutionary transformation. As Abrams (2019) points out, earlier theories did not shy away from boldly theorising about revolutions. Part of that, however, stems from the ability to compare one outcome of interest across cases. Regime change, democratisation, or economic progress as outcome measures carry implicit assumptions or limitations that hinder comparison. For

example, regime change ignores recent revolutions' vulnerability to counter-revolutions or maintaining the status quo (e.g., Clarke, 2023; Bayat, 2017), while democratisation does not allow for comparison across ideologically different revolutions, and economic progress cannot be stripped from the structural factors that shaped its pre-revolutionary patterns. While these measures provide valuable insights into particular revolutionary episodes, they do not provide a common benchmark by which revolutions can be comparatively analysed. Therefore, what the field requires is a neutral and comparable measure of transformation that can be applied across different settings and ideologically diverse revolutions without carrying implicit normative assumptions.

One valuable yet underutilised measure is education. Education acts as a major conduit for states to transmit values to future citizens and rework the myths of society. As a factor it is ideology sensitive, measurable, and path dependent. Studying it as an outcome can illuminate whether revolutions manage to break path dependency and enact their vision of society, thus avoiding the limitations associated with other measures.

Education

Education is a core tenet of modern states and often an object revolutions tackle first hand to cement the regime. Palmer (1985) traces the politicisation of education during the French Revolution (1789-1799). In France's 1791 constitution, one noteworthy clause appears under the rights of education, in which remembrance of the French revolution and its value is stated as a paramount goal. From its onset, they focused on teaching civic values and creating new citizens as future defenders of the Republic (Palmer, 1985). During the Russian revolution of 1917, there was hesitancy to teach any form of ideology (Fitzpatrick, 1979). However, they began by eliminating the teaching of religion from the curriculum. As the regime consolidated and Stalin

took the helm ten years later, the curriculum had a large ideological influence (Fitzpatrick, 1979; Lisovskaya and Karpov, 2004).

Similarly, Bowles (1971) traces education in the Cuban system following the overthrow of the Batista government in 1959. He argues the revolutionary government's program manifested itself in the education system, be it by expanding access to the schooling system across the country (McDonald, 2000), or enacting structural reforms to escape the cultural hegemony of the US (Bowles, 1971). Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 attempted to remove Western influence from its education. Their first actions entailed closure of higher education for one year to adapt the curriculum to the new cultural and political reality (Fallahi, 1993). Moreover, An et al. (2011) finds that during the Chinese cultural revolution (1966-1976), mathematics textbooks contained ideological content to cement Maoist tradition. For example, this was done by framing of problems as “how many Chinese civilians were killed by the Japanese army,” (An et al., 2011, p. 252) or the random insertion of Maoist quotes.

These examples illustrate the importance of the education curriculum for revolutionary regimes. Education remains to be an under-utilised outcome measure, particularly in quantitative work. As shown, key to the evolution of prior waves was the agency-centric explanations that sought to understand revolutions beyond structural factors. While the fifth generation of revolutionary theory improved our understanding of revolutionary outcomes, the role of revolutionary ideology in shaping these long-term outcomes remains largely unexamined. Understanding whether and how ideology drives transformation can help bridge the divide between agency-centred explanations and earlier theories that emphasised transformation as a defining feature of revolutions. Thus, the theoretical framework and subsequent analysis aims to

address the following research question: To what extent does revolutionary ideology shape educational curriculum transformation following a revolutionary episode?

Theoretical Framework

Revolutionary Theory

Earlier definitions of revolutions maintain a rigid standard for events to qualify as revolutions. Huntington (1968) defines revolutions as “rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies,” (p. 264). Owing to the second generational thinking of his definition, he argues that revolutions emerge to accommodate the political participation of new groups to modernise the state. Moreover, he sees a successful revolution as entailing two main elements: rapid political mobilisation and institutionalisation. These two factors ensure that the inherent structure of the state is changed. Theda Skocpol (1979), on the other hand, views revolutions as political and social transformation. For both Skocpol and Huntington, not meeting these definitions does not qualify a movement to be deemed a genuine revolution. Similarly, Goldstone’s (2001) definition retains the transformative element necessary for revolutions.

In a further distinction, Kornai (1991) distinguishes between revolution and reform. He defines a revolution as a process that transforms the fundamental institutions of society, namely politics and ideology, property ownership, and coordination mechanisms, irrespective of levels of violence taking place. Reform, on the other hand, is distinguished by its demand to change some facets of the regime while keeping the fundamental system intact (Kornai, 1991).

Beissinger (2022b) defines it as a “a mass siege of an established government by its own

population with the aim of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order,” (p. 435).

Thus, common to the various definitions presented, it is evident that an inherent feature of revolutions is a demand for the transformation of a major aspect of society. Revolutions may differ in nature and specific goals, but by and large they all set out to recourse a certain aspect of society. As such, this paper argues that transformation should be a key metric by which to assess the success of a revolution. This element remains consistent throughout the different generations of revolutionary theory. For analytical purposes, this paper adopts Beissinger’s (2022b) definition on revolutions above. Despite supposed difference in what qualifies as a revolution, the debate should instead centre on what defines success in a revolution. This can allow the field to advance and avoid circular logic: an event often needs to be studied before being deemed a revolution. In the following sections, this paper attempts to bridge these approaches by introducing the critical juncture framework, followed by a section on the proposed causal factor, ideology.

Critical Junctures

Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) offer a viable framework for causal analysis that allows for both antecedent conditions and agency. They (2007) define critical junctures as brief windows of time in which agent’s choices affect the outcome of interest before locking in path dependency (p. 348). Collier and Collier (1991) define critical junctures as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries... and which is hypothesised to produce distinct legacies,” (p. 29). During a critical juncture, the range of options become open and long-lasting.

The critical juncture approach contains five key elements that define its window (Collier and Collier, 1991; Collier, 2024). First, the presence of antecedent conditions that create the baseline by which to assess the legacy created. Second, the crisis or shock that initiates the critical juncture. Third, the critical juncture in which change, or innovation, is possible. Fourth, the aftermath of the critical juncture. Fifth, the legacy of the critical juncture, which entails the reproduction that sets the critical juncture outcome in a path dependent trajectory (Collier, 2024).

Della Porta (2020) first bridges the literature between social movements and critical junctures. She analyses eventful protests as movements that break the pattern and provide avenues for new institutional consolidation and norm diffusion. She defines social movements as critical junctures that trigger said change. In a similar fashion, Vahabi et al. (2020) conceptualise revolutions as a source of “institutional innovation,” (p. 858). In an analogy to Tilly’s (1985) argument that war made states in Europe, Vahabi et al. (2020) analyse the French and British revolutions, arguing that revolutions - like war, can constitute crucial moments of institutional formation. They can be avenues for economic efficiency and positive institutional change. Beissinger (2022b) contends with this argument, finding that revolutions generally have positive changes, though with the added nuance that its record is far from clear. Alternatively, they can lead to negative instances of change or civil wars. Yet this precise characteristic is what makes them critical junctures - a culmination of antecedent conditions and certain factors during the revolutionary episode collide to create divergent outcomes between revolutions.

Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) argue that change is not a necessary element of critical juncture as long as the possibility for change exists. Similar to the evolution of revolutionary theory, they argue that heightened agency during a critical juncture is vital for an event to be considered as a critical juncture. Collier and Collier (1991), on the other hand, focus on random

and structural factors that set an outcome on a path-dependent trajectory. They (1991) argue that the presence of a legacy is necessary for an event to qualify as a critical juncture. Both logics have merit and offer a useful framework by which to construct this study - one that incorporates agency without ignoring structural factors. This fluidity can prove to be a defining feature of the fifth generation of revolutionary theory in which quantitative conclusions can be reached while keeping agency and structural factors in account.

Moreover, Della Porta's (2020) work demonstrates that social movements, like revolutions, cause a break in institutional patterns, followed by a period of change that allows for new pathways to occur. Vahabi et al. (2020) conceptualise this mechanism as a first stage of institutional breakdown, followed by re-institutionalisation. In the first stage, a void is created in which the people perceive themselves as the legitimate sovereign to define new institutions. This is followed by a competition between radical and moderate figures, and the domination of one group. As radicals can seldom survive in power, they are either expelled or forced to moderate, which invites the second stage: re-institutionalisation.

As though in direct response to Vahabi et al.'s (2020) stages of revolution, Karpov and Lisovskaya's (2004) earlier work analyses educational reform during revolutions and finds similar patterns. Their analysis provides an integral framework to studying curriculum change during revolutions. They define educational change as, "the totality of long-term large-scale changes in institutions, practices and social groups..."(p. 24). Within educational change, two components arise: reform and mutations. Reforms are intended structural changes that reflect the will of the states, while mutations are micro-level unintended consequences such as local initiatives that are not consistent with political goals. The former necessitates a stable order, while mutations thrive in chaos. As argued, revolutions entail a first stage of institutional

breakdown and need time to reach the re-institutional phase. Karpov and Lisovskaya (2004) conceptualise these phases as the radical and conservative phase.

Their main argument builds on the claim that intentional educational reform occurs once a regime reaches the conservative stage marked by stability and order, rather than during the radical and contentious stage of a revolution. This can be marked as the transition during the end of the revolution, in which the re-institutionalisation phase commences - the aftermath of the critical juncture.

Thus, the radical stage of a revolution, and the void created during the institutional breakdown constitute the critical juncture where decisions made in this window affect the re-institutionalisation and conservative phase of a revolution. The re-institutionalisation and conservative phase act as the fourth stage of critical junctures, the aftermath of a revolution which cements the institutional trajectory of the state. In sum, the critical juncture approach acts as a framework that accounts for different factors, while allowing the field to attempt bold theories with variables that are essential during the critical juncture. As the next section argues, revolutionary ideology constitutes one such factor. Specifically, the extent to which revolutionaries are able to institutionalise their ideological vision through the educational system may help explain variation in revolutionary transformation.

Ideology

As shown in the literature, revolutions may succeed in challenging the regime without necessarily transforming society. If transformation remains as a defining feature for revolutionary success, the key task ahead is understanding how revolutionary actors translate their vision into durable change. This section argues that revolutionary ideology plays a central role in this process. That is, it examines how revolutionary ideologies are institutionalised

through the educational curriculum, drawing on Althusser (1971) concept of the ISA to explain why some revolutions produce lasting transformation while others do not.

Althusser's (1971) framework conceptualises a state's hold on power stemming from not only the control of coercive institutions, but more importantly the control of the ideological state apparatus (ISA). Unlike coercive institutions, ideological institutions such as the school system, family, or religious institutions function to ensure cohesion and reproduce the "values" of society (Althusser, 1971, p. 81). He (1971) argues that no ruling class can function and remain durable without "exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatus," (p. 81).

Crucially, transforming the ISA is by no means a simple task. Althusser (1971) argues that ideological institutions are more difficult to reshape than coercive institutions. The former are deeply embedded in society and function to reproduce the dominant values of society across generations. Coercive institutions, on the other hand, can be sufficiently changed by mere regime change, but lasting transformation requires re-orienting the ideological foundations through which political authority is legitimised. In that sense, control of the ISA is consistent with earlier definitions of revolutions that emphasise change in the dominant values, myths, and rationale for holding power (e.g., Huntington, 1968).

As shown in the literature, one key avenue through which revolutionaries' manifest control of the ISA is the educational system. Benavot et al. (2007) finds that educational curricula have a major role in consolidating nation-states. They tend to serve as a mean to reinforce societal values and legitimate the political reality. In parallel, Paglayan (2022) develops a theory that conceptualises mass education as a state-building tool. She (2022) argues it is used to propagate acceptance of the status quo, being mainly driven by fear of internal conflict or mass rebellion. Regimes utilise education to elongate their rule and ensure political stability.

Furthermore, Althusser (1971) claims that the ruling class' ideology often dominates the ISA such as educational entities. Similarly, Apple (1993) argues that the shape of the education curriculum sheds light on who has power in society. How history itself is taught is a reproduction of power and dominance in society.

As shown in the examples of the literature review, each revolution attempts to manifest its own set of ideologies in the ISA, sometimes succeeding and other times failing. For example, the French revolutionaries had various aspiration for the fostering of new citizens and public schooling, but were limited in their fiscal capacity to achieve all their stated goals, whereas the Chinese cultural revolution involved extensive curriculum reform to promote Maoist ideology. Apart from structural conditions such as state capacity and economic conditions, which this paper seeks to account for, one possible explanation for this variation lies in revolutionary ideology itself. Revolutions differ not only in their goals, but also in the extent and vision of their ideological programme.

In revolution without revolutionaries, Bayat (2018) employs a nuanced conceptualisation of the Arab Spring movements. He defines them as refolutions, “revolutionary movements that emerged to compel the incumbent state to change themselves, to carry out meaningful reforms on behalf of the revolution,” (p. 18). They neither carried substantial weight to qualify as a revolution, nor were devoid of substance to be deemed a reform movement. His critique highlights that many current day revolutions lack the transformational depth deemed necessary by earlier definitions of revolutions. Bayat (2017) argues that one of the key reasons the Arab Spring failed to transform society is due to its lack of an ideological or programmatic framework. Unlike past revolutions in the region, which integrated elements from alternative socialist or Marxist-Islamist ideologies, the Arab Spring took the neoliberal framework for granted. To some

extent, this occurred due to the established neoliberal framework of the world and the absence of an alternative ideology by which the protestors could articulate their demands. The Arab Spring movements were more concerned with identity politics and the politics of recognition over the politics of class (Bayat, 2017). Their demands centred around vague conceptualisations of justice, equality, and anti-corruption. Instead, however, Bayat (2017) argues that revolutions need a “body of ideas, strategies, and visions that inform the social order revolutionaries desire and a way to achieve it,” (p. 29).

For example, Bayat (2017) traces the 1979 Iranian revolution to illustrate that it represented an ideologically rich movement that integrated Marxist philosophy and political Islam, representing a third way that shaped the ethos of the revolutionaries. This was grounded in “anti-imperialist, anticapitalist, radical democratic, and Islamist impulse...” (Bayat, 2017, p. 29). Furthermore, these clear traditions and synthesis by the intellectual class shaped the political and social thinking of the revolutionaries and manifested itself in the state’s political, economic, and educational institutions. Key to this ideological anchoring was the notion of “neither East nor West,” (Bayat, 2017, p. 29). This example sharply contrasts with the Arab Spring and illustrates his broader argument that revolutions require a coherent ideological programme capable of articulating a vision of society in order to achieve transformation.

Building on Bayat’s insights, this paper argues that revolutionary ideologies differ in the extent to which they provide a programmatic vision for institutional transformation. Some ideologies have a comprehensive revolutionary vision of political, economic, and social order, while others focus narrowly on representation, recognition, or political procedure. These differences could explain the extent to which revolutionary actors are able to institutionalise their vision through the ISA.

Marxist philosophies view the structural organisation of society as the source of social and political problems (Marx and Engels, 1848). They take a total view of society, arguing that meaningful change necessitates both political and social transformation. They seek to change the economic structure underlying the state and its means of production (Marx and Engels, 1848). As such, Marxists ideologies provide revolutionaries with a comprehensive programme for societal transformation and a clear vision of the alternative order they seek to establish (Bayat, 2017). This totalising nature, therefore, gives revolutionaries a coherent framework through which to manifest their ideology in the ISA. Thus, we expect Leftist revolutions to have a large transformational effect on the ISA.

Hypothesis 1: Leftist revolutionary ideology has a positive transformational effect on socialist curriculum content seven years after a revolution.

In addition to Marxist ideology, Islamist revolutions similarly articulate a comprehensive vision for the political and social order of society. As Bayat (2017) demonstrates, Islamism arose as a third way for the Muslim middle class who rejected capitalist structures and socialist utopias. Rather than seeking limited political reform, Islamist movements sought to articulate an alternative social order grounded in religious principles and resistant to Western domination (Bayat, 2017). Islamist movements provided revolutionaries with a substantive programme through which to shape political, social, and educational institutions. Thereby, we expect Islamist revolutions to have a large transformational effect on the ISA.

Hypothesis 2: Islamist revolutionary ideology has a positive transformational effect on religious curriculum content seven years after a revolution.

In parallel to these substantive ideologies, democratic revolutionary ideology primarily focuses on political representation, accountability, and constitutional governance rather than

comprehensive social transformation. They seek to contain abusive governments and attain inclusion, equality, and recognition (Beissinger, 2022b; Bayat, 2017). Similar to Bayat's (2017) critique of the Arab Spring, democratic revolutionary ideology often seek reform of political institutions within the existing framework rather than instead of it. Therefore, while democratic revolutionary ideologies possess coherent demands, their focus on political procedure rather than broader social transformation leads us to expect a weaker transformational effect on the ISA compared to Leftist and Islamist revolutionary ideologies.

Hypothesis 3: Democratic revolutionary ideology has a comparatively weak to moderate effect on democratic curriculum content seven years after a revolution

Similarly, ethnic mobilisation, as per Beissinger's (2022b) classification, centres on recognition and identity. These movements seek to elevate a marginalised ethnic group or overturn an existing racial hierarchy (Beissinger, 2022b). As such, they seek to challenge dominant narratives and seek greater recognition of excluded identities. In doing so, they seek to reshape collective memory, historical narratives and representations of identity within state institutions. However, their narrower focus on the politics of recognition may detract from the totalising vision of substantive ideologies. Therefore, we expect a weaker transformational effect on the ISA compared to Leftist and Islamist revolutionary ideologies.

Hypothesis 4: Ethnic revolutionary ideology has a comparatively weak to moderate effect on ethnic curriculum content seven years after a revolution.

These expectations reflect the different nature of revolutionary ideologies. That said, however, revolutionary ideology alone may be insufficient to achieving transformation in the ISA. Tilly (1978) defines revolution as events that create competing centres of power, a concept he terms as multiple sovereignty. As Bayat (2017) illustrates, the Arab Spring did not compete

for power. They had an extensive repertoire of tactics yet lacked a coherent strategy for capturing and institutionalising power. This meant that the status quo was maintained at the expense of transformation. As such, revolutionary ideology may only translate into durable educational transformation when revolutionaries successfully acquire state power. Therefore, regime change may serve as an enabling condition through which ideological programmes can manifest themselves within the ISA. Consequently, the effect of revolutionary ideology is expected to be stronger in cases where revolutions successfully overthrow the incumbent regime. The following hypotheses capture this expectation.

Hypothesis 1a: regime change positively moderates effect of Leftist revolutionary ideology on socialist curriculum content seven years after a revolution

Hypothesis 2a: regime change positively moderates the effect of Islamist revolutionary ideology on religious curriculum content seven years after a revolution

Hypothesis 3a: regime change positively moderates the effect of Democratic revolutionary ideology on democratic curriculum content seven years after a revolution

Hypothesis 4a: regime change positively moderates the effect of Ethnic revolutionary ideology on ethnic curriculum content seven years after a revolution.

Synthesis

In sum, this framework highlights the importance of transformation as the common element across the different generations of revolutionary theory. In order to adhere to the methodological rigour of the fifth generation, while retaining the core tenets of earlier generation that have general theories on revolution, this framework adopts the critical juncture framework to account for structural factors while focusing on the main variable of interest: ideology. As shown

in the final section, ideology is a key mechanism by which revolutionaries can manifest their revolutionary program in the ISA.

Overall, the premise of this framework posits that successful revolutions manage to transform the educational system to consolidate their rule. A revolutionary onset creates a period of instability that constitutes a critical juncture. During this period, revolutionary actors possess heightened agency to reshape institutions and define the future trajectory of the state. This paper argues that ideology is a key factor shaping this process. That is, revolutions guided by coherent ideological programmes are more likely to survive the radical phase of the revolution, consolidate power, and institutionalise their vision through the ISA. The depth and scope of that ideological programme is expected to influence the extent of the resulting transformation and to be moderated by regime change. Educational curriculum transformation represents one manifestation of this process where intentional reform can be observed. Moreover, this change is expected to be long lasting and path dependent. In contrast, revolutions that fail to consolidate their ideological programme signify a lack of control of the ISA and hence exhibit weaker transformational effects.

Methodology

Research Design

This study employs a quantitative cross-national study focusing on revolutionary episodes as the unit of analysis. Similar to one part of Beissinger's (2022b) study on long-term outcomes of revolutions, it employs a pre-post design within country to compare the dependent variable mean five years before a revolutions, and seven years after. The choice for the time range stems from theoretical and methodological factors. First, it acts as a sufficient timeframe by which to allow revolutions to overcome the radical stage identified by Karpov and Lisovskaya

(2004). An earlier analysis provides less sufficient time for revolutionary regimes to consolidate and manifest their changes in the curriculum. The mean of these seven years is crucial for critical juncture to capture the average effect, rather than a one-off extremity. Second, it borrows from Beissinger's (2022b) methodological rationale whereby seven years can act as a well enough timeframe to understand the longer-term impact of revolutions, while retaining sufficient time to isolate the causal effect. A longer timeframe enhances interpretability of the critical juncture's legacy, but this presents methodological challenges. Nonetheless, robustness windows will be run on the main specifications, thereby analysing post-revolutionary curriculum change 5, 10, 15, and 20 years after a revolution.

Data Sources

The analysis centres on two datasets: Beissinger's (2022a) revolutionary database, developed for his (2022b) book *The Revolutionary City*; and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem; 2026). As Korotayev, Grinin, et al. (2025) observes, Beissinger's revolutionary dataset acted as one of several crucial triggers that allow the fifth generation of revolutionary theory to manifest itself. His dataset contains 345 revolutionary episodes ranging from 1900 to 2014. Unlike other datasets such as Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO; Chenoweth and Shay, 2022) which focus on violent campaigns, Beissinger's (2022a) database focus on revolutionary episodes as the main unit of analysis, coding various attributes related to its process, tactics, and regime change outcomes. The sample covers revolutionary episodes from 1952 to 2014, reflecting the availability of complete V-Dem curriculum data for pre and post-revolutionary windows. The V-Dem database offers a wide range of institutional factors. V-Dem is primarily used to measure transformation in the ISA through educational curriculum measures, and to incorporate control factors such as state capacity and economic output.

Variables

Dependent Variables

The main outcome of interest in this analysis is transformation of the educational curriculum of the state as one means of changing the ISA. This is operationalised by the questionnaire developed by Neundorf et al. (2023) in the V-Dem database. Specifically, they ask country experts to answer the following question and mean-aggregate their responses: “How would you characterise the dominant societal model(s) or ideology(ies) promoted through the history curriculum...?” (Neundorf et al. 2023 p. 28). Relevant to the analysis are the following responses: “Socialist or Communist;” “Democratic norms;” “Democratic institutions;” “Religious;” and “Ethnicity, clan, or tribe”. Responses are aggregated into continuous measures ranging from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate a stronger presence of the corresponding ideology within the history curriculum. The Democratic ideology hypothesis (H3) is coded as the combined/simple average of democratic norms and democratic institutions, while socialist or communist, religious education, and ethnic education corresponds to the Leftist hypothesis (H1), Islamist hypothesis (H2), and ethnic Hypothesis (H4), respectively. This measure is theoretically grounded in the paper’s framework. Earlier definitions of revolutions emphasise the transformation of dominant values, myths, and the justification for political authority. Measuring education curricula scores through this question acts as a useful indicator for assessing whether revolutionary ideologies manifested themselves in the societal model taught in the curriculum.

Independent Variables

The main independent variables are revolutionary ideologies, operationalised by Beissinger’s (2022a) coding goals of a revolution. He codes them based on the following. Leftist goals are revolutions that seek to transform the class structure of society. Democratic goals are

revolutions that seek to contain an abusive government, attain civil liberties, or achieve democratisation. Islamist goals are revolutions that seek the creation of an Islamist-based political order. Lastly, ethnic order goals are revolutions that seek an inversion of an ethnic or racially based political order.

As control factors, state capacity is operationalised by Neundorff et al. (2023) centralisation of the education system index, which measures to what extent regimes have control over the education system based on their centralisation of the curriculum and textbooks. The mean of this index five years before a revolution is considered. The pre-revolutionary economy is operationalised through GDP per capita from Farris et al. (2021) in V-Dem. Specifically, the log of mean GDP per capita five years before a revolutions is used. Furthermore, revolutionary violence is operationalised using Beissinger's (2022a) measure of revolutionary deaths, calculated as the log average number of deaths associated with a revolutionary episode. Both GDP per capita and revolutionary deaths are log-transformed to reduce skewness and influence of extreme observations.

Lastly, regime change is used as a moderating variable for revolutionary ideology. Beissinger (2022b) defines it as the opposition force taking power at the end of the revolutionary episode. Instead of restricting the sample to revolutions that achieve regime change, utilising it as a moderator allows analysis into whether the effect of revolutionary ideology differs depending on whether opposition force take power or not.

Empirical Strategy

The analysis employs an OLS regression. OLS diagnostic tests were conducted to assess multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and model specification (see Appendix C). Variance Inflation Factors indicate no evidence of problematic multicollinearity. Breusch-Pagan tests

indicated heteroscedasticity in some model specifications, while Ramsey RESET tests showed potential misspecification in selected models. Mirroring Beissinger's (2022b) empirical strategy, all models employ clustered standard error at the revolutionary episode level to accommodate heteroscedasticity. Moreover, due to the bounded nature of the dependent variables fractional logit models are estimated as a robustness check, producing substantively similar results (Table B4).

The following section presents the results of this analysis before discussion their implications for the theoretical framework.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 lists the frequencies of ideologies in revolutions in our sample. The most frequent are Democratic (N=57, 42.5%), followed by Ethnic (N=37, 27.6%), Leftist (N=32, 23.9%) and Islamist (N=6, 4.5%), noting that these categories are not mutually exclusive. As shown in the Co-Occurrence matrix in Table A3, however, only three revolutions are coded as having Leftist and Democratic ideology simultaneously. Similarly, six are both leftist and ethnic, and only one is both Islamist and ethnic. None are both Islamist and Democratic, while 8 are both Democratic and Ethnic.

Table 1
Distribution of Revolutionary Ideology Types


Ideology type	N	%
Leftist	32	23.9
Islamist	6	4.5
Democratic	57	42.5
Ethnic	37	27.6
Other	20	14.9

Note. Full analysis sample (N = 134). Categories are not mutually exclusive; percentages sum to more than 100%. 'Other' includes elite rivalry, independence, antimonarchy, separatist, and right-wing revolutions; serves as reference category in primary model.

Figure 1 illustrates the temporal period of these revolutions. As further shown in table A2 virtually all leftist revolutions occurred before 1991 (Soviet collapse; N=30). Most Democratic revolutions in the sample occur after 1991 (N=32), and the remaining (N=25) before 1991. Ethnic revolutions are somewhat balanced between both time periods, with 21 ethnic revolutions occurring before 1991, and 16 occurring after 1991. Lastly, four Islamist revolutions occurred before 1991, and two after. Spatially, Table A2 shows the ideological distribution of these revolutions by world region. Europe has a noticeable near absence of Ethnic and Leftist revolutions. Apart from Europe, leftist revolutions are spread out across the regions, with most concentration in Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, most ethnic revolutions took place in Sub-Saharan Africa. (N=23), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (MENA; N=10). Democratic revolutions are fairly spread out, while Islamist revolutions are evidently concentrated in MENA and one case in Asia.

60% of Democratic revolutions in the sample resulted in regime change (see Table A4). Similarly, half of the Islamist revolutions and nearly half of the ethnic revolutions in the sample achieved regime change. Only 12 leftist revolutions in the sample achieved regime change (37.5%), making it the least to result in regime change.

Figure 1
Revolutionary Ideology Types by Decade, 1952-2014



Note. Number of revolutionary episodes by ideology types per decade, 1952-2014. Full analysis sample (N=134). Categories are not mutually exclusive. Dashed vertical line indicates one year just before Soviet collapse.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Curriculum Variables and Controls

Variable	N	Pre-mean	Post-mean	SD	Min	Max
H1: Socialist curriculum	114	0.174	0.132	0.268	0.000	1.000
H2: Religious curriculum	114	0.258	0.269	0.362	0.000	1.000
H3: Democratic curriculum (combined)	114	0.174	0.272	0.262	0.000	1.000
H4: Ethnic curriculum	114	0.120	0.126	0.235	0.000	1.000
Education centralisation (control)	114	0.651		0.204	0.072	0.883
Log GDP per capita (control)	114	2.053		0.914	-0.118	4.083
Log deaths (control)	111	2.792		1.780	0.000	6.010

Note. Primary model sample (N = 114). Pre-mean: 5-year window before revolution start year. Post-mean: 7-year window after revolution end year. Controls show pre-revolutionary mean only (no post-mean).

Table 2 illustrates the average values of the dependent and independent variables.

Socialist curriculum, on average, decrease in the seven years following a revolution. Democratic curriculum, on the other hand, has the highest mean after revolutions, 0.272. Ethnic and religious curriculum remain relatively similar before and after a revolution. On average, education is fairly centralised in the sample (M= 0.651, SD = 0.204), ranging from 0.072 to 0.883.

Inferential Statistics

Overall, the ideology of a revolution has a heterogenous effect on educational curriculum after a revolution. The following sections briefly presents the baseline model for the main hypotheses, followed by alternative explanations, and robustness checks.

Baseline Models

Pre-revolutionary baseline is the largest and most significant predictor of ideology in the curriculum. This pattern is consistent across all models in the analysis. In the Baseline model, Table 3, Islamist and ethnic revolutions have a positive and significant effect on religious and

ethnic curriculum, respectively. That said, it is crucial to note that Islamist revolution make up only six cases in our sample, thus suggesting the statistical findings regarding Islamist revolutions must be taken with caution.

Table 3
Baseline Model: Ideology and Curriculum Content

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.512*** (0.112)	0.781*** (0.063)	0.807*** (0.088)	0.617*** (0.136)
Leftist revolution	0.036 (0.062)	0.093 (0.061)	0.015 (0.066)	-0.012 (0.037)
Islamist revolution	-0.065 (0.068)	0.398** (0.128)	-0.074 (0.059)	0.140* (0.070)
Democratic revolution	-0.060 (0.038)	0.033 (0.029)	0.074 (0.049)	0.009 (0.029)
Ethnic revolution	-0.017 (0.039)	0.066+ (0.038)	-0.012 (0.044)	0.099* (0.040)
Regime change	-0.014 (0.043)	0.018 (0.036)	0.075* (0.037)	0.003 (0.031)
Start year	-0.002+ (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	134	134
R2	0.368	0.698	0.448	0.480
R2 Adj.	0.333	0.681	0.417	0.452

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions (elite rivalry, independence, antimonarchy, separatist, right-wing). Full analysis sample (N = 134). Standard errors clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Democratic curriculum content has the highest pre-revolutionary baseline effect ($\beta = 0.807$, p -value < 0.001), followed by religious ($\beta = 0.781$, p -value < 0.001), ethnic ($\beta = 0.781$, p -value < 0.001), and socialist ($\beta = 0.512$, p -value < 0.001) content in the curriculum. This pattern is maintained throughout almost all models.

Holding everything constant, Islamist revolutions predict a positive and statistically significant effect on religious curriculum content seven years after a revolution ($\beta = 0.398$, p -

value <0.01). Start year also has a significant but minimal effect ($\beta = 0.003$, p-value <0.01), suggesting a modest trend in religious curriculum content across the revolutions in the sample. Moreover, Islamist revolutions have a significant and positive effect on ethnic content in the curriculum ($\beta = 0.140$, p-value <0.05). Ethnic revolutions, on the other hand, have a slightly weaker but statistically significant effect on ethnic content in the curriculum ($\beta = 0.099$, p-value <0.05). Like Islamist revolutions, they predict a marginally significant increase in religious content in the curricula seven years after a revolution. Thus far, these patterns support H2 and H4. By contrast, H1 and H3 receive no support in this model.

As further shown in Table 3, regime change has a positive and significant effect on democratic content in the curriculum ($\beta = 0.075$, p-value <0.05). This means that, holding all variables constant, revolutions that achieve regime change generally increase democratic content in the education seven years after a revolution.

Table 4*Baseline Model with Interaction: Ideology × Regime Change Interactions*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.498*** (0.101)	0.765*** (0.065)	0.755*** (0.094)	0.610*** (0.135)
Leftist revolution	-0.139* (0.065)	0.078 (0.056)	0.007 (0.065)	-0.016 (0.039)
Islamist revolution	-0.115 (0.077)	0.188 (0.121)	-0.081 (0.053)	0.150* (0.075)
Democratic revolution	-0.071+ (0.039)	0.034 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.062)	0.012 (0.029)
Ethnic revolution	-0.033 (0.040)	0.075+ (0.039)	-0.013 (0.044)	0.042 (0.041)
Regime change	-0.107* (0.042)	-0.002 (0.035)	0.008 (0.053)	-0.030 (0.034)
× Regime change	0.409*** (0.104)	0.418* (0.197)	0.161* (0.074)	0.114 (0.078)
Start year	-0.002 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	134	134
R2	0.468	0.712	0.467	0.493
R2 Adj.	0.434	0.693	0.433	0.461

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions (elite rivalry, independence, antimonarchy, right-wing, separatist). Full analysis sample (N = 134). Standard errors clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

As shown in Table 4, adding the interaction effect of ideology and regime change, Islamist and Ethnic revolutions as predictive variables lose significance. In this model, regime change conditions the effect for Leftist revolutions on socialist curriculum, Islamist revolutions on religious curriculum, and Democratic revolutions on democratic curriculum.

Ceteris paribus, leftist revolutions that do not achieve regime change have a negative and significant effect on socialist curriculum content seven years after a revolution ($\beta = -0.139$, p-value <0.05). Moreover, the absence of leftist ideology for revolutions that achieve regime change predicts a decrease in socialist curriculum content ($\beta = -0.107$, p-value <0.05). The interaction effect of regime change and Leftist ideology is positive and highly significant ($\beta = 0.409$, p-value <0.001). This means that the positive effect of leftist ideology on socialist curriculum is conditional on regime change. In the same model, Democratic ideology in a revolution predicts a negative marginally significant effect on socialist curriculum content ($\beta = -0.071$, p-value <0.1).

Islamist revolutions effect on religious curriculum lose significance when regime change is held at zero (see Table 4). The interaction effect, however, is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.418$, p-value <0.05), yielding a stronger coefficient than the baseline model in Table 3. In this same model in Table 4, the interaction effect of Democratic ideology and regime change is significant ($\beta = 0.161$, p-value <0.05), similarly suggesting that the effect of democratic ideology on democratic curriculum is conditional on regime change.

Table 5
Ideology × Regime Change Interactions and Full Controls

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.512*** (0.093)	0.750*** (0.063)	0.830*** (0.084)	0.634*** (0.130)
Leftist revolution	-0.136* (0.066)	0.063 (0.056)	0.011 (0.068)	-0.004 (0.043)
Islamist revolution	-0.149+ (0.078)	0.166 (0.125)	-0.077 (0.059)	0.170* (0.083)
Democratic revolution	-0.021 (0.040)	0.002 (0.040)	-0.062 (0.067)	0.023 (0.030)
Ethnic revolution	-0.073 (0.049)	0.098* (0.047)	-0.024 (0.053)	0.042 (0.048)
Regime change	-0.128** (0.046)	0.023 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.057)	-0.045 (0.037)
Ideology × Regime change	0.396*** (0.099)	0.452* (0.181)	0.183* (0.077)	0.133 (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.186* (0.078)	0.083 (0.111)	0.269*** (0.069)	-0.104 (0.097)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.009 (0.021)	0.053** (0.018)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.018)
Log deaths	0.029* (0.014)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.518	0.728	0.516	0.501
R2 Adj.	0.473	0.702	0.471	0.455


Note. Reference category: Other revolutions (elite rivalry, independence, antimonarchy, right-wing, separatist). Full analysis sample (N = 134). Standard errors clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table 5 introduces additional controls to the model. The main effects observed in Table 4 generally remain robust. Regime change continues to significantly moderate the effect of Leftist, Islamist, and Democratic ideology on their respective curriculum content. In this model, Islamist ideology gains a marginally significant negative effect on Socialist curriculum, while the negative effect of Democratic ideology loses significance. Holding all other variables constant, the pre-education centralisation mean five years before a revolution predicts a negative effect on socialist curriculum content ($\beta = -0.186$, $p\text{-value} < 0.05$). This means that highly centralised education systems predict less socialist curriculum content. Pre log GDP per capita has no significant effect, while log deaths is associated with a small but significant positive effect ($\beta = 0.029$, $p\text{-value} < 0.05$).

Moreover, as shown in table 5, ethnic revolutions gain significance at the 5% level in predicting religious curriculum content ($\beta = 0.098$). *Ceteris paribus*, pre-log GDP per capita is positively associated with religious curriculum while log deaths and pre-education centralisation are insignificant. However, unlike socialist curriculum content, pre-education centralisation has a positive and highly significant effect on democratic curriculum content ($\beta = 0.269$, $p\text{-value} < 0.001$). Figure 2 illustrates the coefficient plot of the model.


Figure 2
Coefficient plot for Table 5



Note. Ideology $\times$ regime change interaction coefficients from Table 5 with full controls. Clustered standard errors by revolutionary episode.

Figure 3 illustrates conditional effect of regime change on socialist curriculum outcomes within leftist revolutions. Clearly visible is an interaction effect for leftist revolutions, as noted by the lines crossing each other. As shown in Table A9, leftist revolutions that achieve regime change predict a socialist curriculum score of 0.364, while leftist revolutions that fail to achieve regime change predict a 0.096 score. Thus, holding all other variables constant, leftist revolutions that achieve regime change are expected to produce 0.268 higher socialist curriculum than leftist revolutions that do not achieve regime change.

Figure 3
Predicted Socialist Curriculum Plot for Leftist Revolutions




Note. Predicted socialist curriculum score for leftist and non-leftist revolutionary ideology by regime change outcome. Primary specification with full controls (N=130). Controls held at sample means. Error bars = 95% confidence intervals. Clustered standard errors by revolutionary episode.

Figure 4 illustrates the same relationship for democratic revolutions and democratic curriculum scores. Democratic revolutions that achieve regime change predict 0.394 democratic curriculum content score, compared to 0.212 for democratic revolutions that do not achieve regime change (see table A9). This conditional effect is lower than predicted score for leftist revolutions: democratic revolution that achieve regime change score 0.182 points higher than democratic revolutions that fail to achieve regime change. Islamist revolutions, on the other hand, predict a larger conditional difference of 0.475 between Islamist revolutions that achieve regime change and Islamist revolutions that do not (see figure A1; Table A9). However, this

figure must be interpreted cautiously due to the limited number of Islamist revolutionary episode (N=6).

Figure 4

Predicted Democratic Curriculum Plot for Democratic Revolutions



Note. Predicted democratic curriculum score for democratic and non-democratic revolutionary ideology by regime change outcome. Primary specification with full controls (N=130). Controls held at sample means. Error bars = 95% confidence intervals. Clustered standard errors by revolutionary episode.

Overall, model fit is relatively high across all models, with an Adjusted R2 ranging from 0.501 to 0.728 in Table 5. However, this likely reflects the inclusion of the pre-revolutionary curriculum as a baseline in the model. As shown in Table B12 of the robustness checks, excluding the pre-revolutionary baseline, the adjusted R2 model decreases to 0.164, 0.159.

0.128, and 0.040 for Socialist, Religious, Democratic, and Ethnic curriculum hypotheses, respectively.

Thus, the interaction models indicate that the effect of revolutionary ideology on curriculum transformation is conditional on regime change. These findings support H1a, H2a, and H3a. Evidence for H2a should be interpreted cautiously due to the limited number of Islamist revolutionary episodes in the sample (N=6). While H2 and H4 find support in the baseline specification, this relationship is not robust to the inclusion of regime change interactions and control, thereby yielding no support for their independent effects.

Alternative Explanations

Tables A10-A13 introduce the interaction of alternative variables to the ideology and regime change interaction effect. As shown in Table A10, none of the ideologies nor interaction effect with pre-education centralisation show significance. Pre-education centralisation is marginally significant as a control for democratic curriculum content, while regime change is significant for democratic curriculum, regardless of ideology (similar to Table 3).

As shown in Table A11, leftist ideology has a positive and statistically significant effect on socialist curriculum content ($\beta = 0.437$, p-value < 0.01). However, this effect is conditional on low pre-revolutionary economic development. The interaction effect between leftist ideology and pre-revolutionary log GDP per capita is negative and significant ($\beta = -0.195$, p-value < 0.01). This means that the positive effect of leftist ideology ($\beta = 0.437$) on socialist curriculum content becomes weaker as pre-revolutionary economic development increases. Moreover, pre-revolutionary economic development predicts a positive and statistically significant increase in religious curriculum content when Islamist ideology is held at 0 ($\beta = 0.047$, p-value < 0.05).

Log deaths negatively condition the effect of democratic ideology on democratic curriculum content ($\beta = -0.042$, $p\text{-value} < 0.1$; see table A12). At low levels of revolutionary violence, democratic ideology is associated with a positive significant increase in democratic curriculum content seven years after a revolution ($\beta = 0.173$ $p\text{-value} < 0.01$). As revolutionary violence increases, the positive effect of democratic ideology on democratic curriculum content decreases.

Robustness

A series of robustness checks were conducted to assess the sensitivity of the main findings to alternative specifications, sample restrictions, and measurement windows (see Appendix B). These include region and decade fixed effects, alternative change-score dependent variable, alternative post revolution measurement windows (5, 10, 15, and 20 years), and the exclusion of influential cases.

Overall, the main findings for H1a, and H2a, are robust to all specifications, while H3a diminishes in significance in the decade fixed effect and 10 year window estimate; and loses significance in the 15 and 20 year window estimation. Moreover, within a model with a sample of revolutions that achieved regime change ($N=62$), democratic ideology loses significance. The results are robust to the exclusion of influential observations (see figure C3; Table B13) and to alternative specification of revolutionary violence as armed dummy variable instead of the log of deaths. Leftist and Democratic ideology are robust to dropping the Islamist ideology dummy variable (due to its limited cases, $N=6$). Moreover, all three main findings about the interaction effect (H1a, H2a, H3a) remain robust to the additional control of pre-revolutionary incumbent regime (democratic, communist). Given the bounded nature of the dependent variables,

fractional logit models were estimated as an additional robustness check (Table B4). The main results remain unchanged.

Further, a pre-treatment check addresses one potential selection bias by estimating whether ideology predicts pre-revolutionary curriculum content (see Table B3). The absence of significance for the main hypotheses suggests that revolutionary ideologies are not systematically associated with high curriculum content score for their corresponding ideology before a revolutionary episode.

Finally, they remain robust to the exclusion of the other reference category from the sample (elite rivalry, independence, antimonarchy, right-wing, separatist) and estimating the effect of leftist and Islamist revolutions in reference to Democratic and ethnic; and estimating the effect of democratic and ethnic relative to Leftist and Islamist revolutions (Table B17).

Discussion

The findings can be situated within the critical juncture framework. Pre-revolutionary economy and education centralisation constitute antecedent conditions that shape the context in which revolutions occur. The revolutionary episode represents a critical juncture that created a period of heightened agency in which institutional trajectories can be altered. The results suggest that revolutionary ideology influences the extent of this transformation, while regime change acts an enabling condition that allows revolutionaries to manifest their revolutionary program. Curriculum transformation represents one observable manifestation of successful control over the ISA. While alternative explanations also shape these outcomes, the main findings remain broadly consistent across specifications. This section contextualises these findings and discusses their theoretical implications.

Undoubtedly, all curricula scores are affected by their pre-revolutionary baseline. This is suggestive of high path dependency even with revolutionary outbreak. Taking that into account, the findings of our hypotheses (H1a, H2a, H3a) that revolutionary ideology predicts curriculum change despite strong path dependency suggest that revolutions do constitute genuine institutional breaks. This corresponds with Della Porta's (2020) qualitative analysis on social movement as critical junctures that cause a break in the institutional patterns. Moreover, it is reflective of Lisovskaya and Karpov's (2004) framework of the conservative stage, where we find that revolutions with the three ideologies of Leftist, Islamist, and Democratic do enact intended reforms that increase the presence of their corresponding ideology. Moreover, they tend to decrease the presence of other ideologies in the curriculum as well. Crucially, these findings are entirely moderated by regime change.

For example, Islamist and Democratic revolutions tend to decrease socialist curriculum score. The findings are not consistent on which Ideology reduces it most; however, the main results show that non-leftist revolutions in general tend to reduce socialist curriculum score if they achieve regime change. For Islamist revolutions this can be surmised to the often-secular nature of socialist ideology. Whereas for democratic revolutions, a connection emerges with Beissinger's (2022b) findings that social revolutions tend to decrease civil liberties and the rule of law.

In parallel to Bayat's line of argument about the necessity of ideology in a revolution, regime change appears to be a defining feature of transformation. While this paper sought to position regime change as one possible explanatory factor, the effects observed appear to be entirely conditioned by regime change. One possible interpretation of the absence of ideological effects without regime change is that incumbent regimes do not incorporate revolutionary

ideologies into the curriculum without a transfer of political power. This demonstrates the importance of control of the coercive institutions conceptualised by Althusser (1971) and the ISA conjointly to shape transformation. This validates Tilly's (1978) conception of multiple sovereignty, whereby revolutions need to create competing centres of power and legitimacy. As such, these findings do not support the main hypotheses about the main effect of ideology on revolutions, H1-H4.

Instead, the findings support the hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a. Revolutionary ideology does affect the strength of transformation of the revolutionary episode seven years after the revolution, conditional on regime change. Each ideology manifests its transformation with ranging effects and is influenced heterogeneously by antecedent conditions. By far, leftist ideology appears to have the strongest effect, where leftist revolutions that achieve regime change are predictive of high socialist content (e.g., see figure 2). Following them, Islamist revolutions have a major effect, followed by Democratic with the least yet still significant effect.

Leftist revolutions tend to have the largest effect in shifting its corresponding curriculum score. As a tax on that, however, they are the only ideology in which failing to achieve regime change leads to reduction in the socialist curriculum score. This suggests a backlash effect, where incumbent regimes react by taking firmer control of the ISA. On the one hand, this could highlight how crucial the ISA is for states to maintain power, where none of the revolutionary ideologies achieve any transformation in the ISA as a form of concession. On the other hand, it highlights the radical nature of leftist revolutionary ideology, where its success leads to large ideological change within the ISA, and its failure or absence to a significant decrease. This unique pattern found for leftist revolutionary ideology highlights an important feature: radical

ideologies appear to achieve the most potential for transformational change, but at the cost of a potential backlash should they fail.

Revolutionary ideology is not the only factor that transforms the ISA during the critical juncture. The analysis finds independent results for revolutionary violence and state capacity. Independent of ideology, revolutionary violence is associated with an increase in socialist curriculum content. While this is consistent with literature that views violence as an inherent element to revolutions, it has no moderating effect on leftist revolutionary ideology. Independent of ideology, pre-revolutionary state capacity measured through educational centralisation increases democratic curriculum content and decreases socialist curriculum content. This pattern warrants further investigation. That said, they do not invalidate the hypotheses as they act independently of revolutionary ideology.

The interesting relationships, however, emerge in the alternative explanation section of the analysis: the moderating effect of pre-revolutionary economic development and revolutionary violence. Pre-revolutionary economic development diminishes the effect of leftist ideology in a revolution and negatively moderates its effect. That is, if leftist revolutions occur in economically developed countries they tend to decrease socialist curriculum content. The alternative is true, where revolutions that occur in low economic developed countries have a large transformative effect. Whether this reflects the independent effect of economic development or a lower likelihood of regime change in wealthier countries falls beyond the scope of this analysis. One possible interpretation is that this is suggestive of the inherent path dependent nature of the ISA and its control by elites, where higher economic development contexts potentially entail a disfavour towards leftist ideology and a backlash effect against it. Revolutionary violence has no similar effect.

Alternatively, democratic revolutions are negatively moderated by revolutionary violence. When revolutionary violence is absent, they tend to have a positive transformational effect. As revolutionary violence increases their presence during a revolution negatively effects the democratic curriculum content. On the one hand, this alternative mechanism support agency-centric perspectives as both these elements are affected in the process of a revolution, rather than structurally effecting it. They constitute factors that occur in the critical juncture itself. More importantly, they illuminate a new mechanism in which democratic revolution's aspiration and action during the revolutionary episode need to align for them to successfully transform the ISA towards their intended revolutionary ideology.

The theoretical expectation highlighted the substantive nature of Leftist and Islamist ideologies over the Democratic and Ethnic ideologies. It was theorised that since Leftist and Islamist revolutions were concerned with the societal aspect of the state, as opposed to merely the political, they would have a strong enough ideology by which to push their programmatic vision in the ISA and not be usurped by the institutions, should they achieve regime change. While the results largely confirm these hypotheses, the consistency of the Democratic revolutionary ideology finding complicates the theoretical framework of this paper.

The consistency of democratic revolutions, on average, increasing the democratic curriculum content illuminates a nuance in the mechanism. The findings illustrate that it may not necessarily be the type of ideology manifested that effects the level of transformation. The broadly consistent effects between the three ideologies show that altering the social reality of society may not be the key-requisite for transformation. Instead, the factor that makes it transformative during the critical juncture may be the ideological coherence of the movement and the competition for power. As Bayat (2017) highlighted, the Arab Spring refused to compete

for power. Instead, they demanded ruling regimes reform themselves. As such, no two Leftist, Islamist, or Democratic revolutions are the same. It would be hardly fair to ascribe this shortcoming of one type of democratic revolutionary ideology to all other democratic revolutionary ideologies, particularly given the result of this analysis. In fact, when excluding influential observations from the analysis, democratic revolutionary ideology interaction effect remains significant, while even ethnic revolutions interaction gains marginal significance (see Table B13).

Democratic ideology perhaps does not include a radical vision of state and society structures, but they do include some procedural forms of government that manifest itself in the educational curricula. Normatively, this suggests that revolutions need not depart from democratic ideals in order to achieve transformational change. While leftist revolutions exhibit the strongest transformational effects, democratic revolutions continue to manifest themselves in the ISA. This suggests that transformational capacity may depend less on the substantive content of the ideological program than on its coherence and attempt to compete and institutionalise power.

Clarke's (2023) analysis on revolutions and vulnerability to counter-revolutions ends with an illuminating paradox. On the one hand, revolutions that engage in violence tend to be more durable as they develop sufficient capacity to withstand counter-revolutions, but they often result in a reduction of freedoms and civil liberties. On the other hand, revolutions that are not violent in nature tend to have improved freedom indices but are more vulnerable to counter-revolutions. Despite that, some of the latter category continue to consolidate established democracies, with the mechanism largely unknown. This paper finds that the transformative effect of democratic revolutionary ideology diminishes as revolutionary violence increases. One

possible explanation is that ideological coherence may help explain why some democratic revolutions successfully consolidate their regimes. Future work can further investigate this effect further.

Thus, the empirical findings inform our theoretical framework in three main ways. One, the common elements (even ethnic) explaining transformational effect may not necessarily be ideological orientation as much as ideological depth and coherence. On average, leftist and Islamist revolutions appear to exemplify that most, but the Democratic significance shows the picture is more nuanced. Second, they illustrate that revolutionary violence manifests itself differently for each revolution, particularly negatively for democratic revolutions. This suggests that revolutions may need to adhere to some standard during the episode if they are to manifest their ideological orientation in the ISA. Third, they confirm that agency-centric perspectives such as ideology and revolutionary violence act as sufficient explanatory factors and warrant further empirical and quantitative work.

Future research should attempt to operationalise ideological coherence across different ideology types to study their transformational effect. Moreover, qualitative case studies can vastly enrich the mechanism proposed in this analysis by explicitly tracing how revolutionaries manifest their ideologies in the various ISA.

Limitations

A primary threat to causal identification is endogeneity. Revolutionary ideologies are not randomly assigned. Countries experiencing different revolutionary ideologies may still systematically differ in ways not fully captured by the model. While the models account for factors such as pre-revolutionary curriculum baseline, economic development, education

centralisation, and revolutionary violence, omitted variables may continue to influence both revolutionary ideology and curriculum change.

Moreover, the operationalisation of revolutionary ideology presents measurement challenges. The analysis relies on Beissinger's (2022a) coding of revolutionary goals rather than ideology directly. While they act as a useful proxy for ideological orientation, they may not fully capture variation in ideological coherence or depth of their revolutionary programmes. As shown in the theoretical implications, revolutionary episodes within the same category are treated equally despite potential differences in ideological sophistication.

Finally, some model specifications exhibit evidence of heteroscedasticity and misspecification. While clustered standard errors and fractional logit were used as robustness checks, these issues warrant caution, nonetheless. Furthermore, the findings relating to Islamist revolutionary ideology should be interpreted with caution due to the limited number of Islamist revolutionary episodes in the sample ($N = 6$).

Conclusion

This paper examined whether revolutionary ideology explains variation in long-term educational curriculum transformation following revolutions. This paper finds that revolutionary ideology explains a large degree of transformation in the educational curriculum.

Theoretically, this paper expected that substantive and comprehensive ideologies that displayed a programmatic vision, such as Leftist and Islamist revolutionary ideologies, would have a larger transformational effect than ideologies that were narrower in their focus and procedural, such as Democratic and Ethnic revolutionary ideologies. Moreover, it was hypothesised that these effects would be moderated by regime change.

More specifically, the analysis finds that Leftist and Islamist revolutionary ideologies have a strong transformational effect, while Democratic ideology has a moderate effect. Ethnic ideology had a null effect. Crucially, however, the significant findings are entirely moderated by regime change, meaning that revolutionary ideology only transforms the educational curriculum when the revolutionaries manage to overthrow the regime.

While it was hypothesised that Leftist and Islamist revolutions were more transformative due to their depth, the continued significance and transformative effect of the democratic finding across model implied that revolutionary ideology may be less predictive due to its content and depth, compared to its coherence and willingness to take power. This suggests paths for future studies that aim to explicate this mechanism, grouping revolutions based on their ideological depth and coherence rather than content.

The framework developed in this paper suggests that the difference between the French Revolution and the Arab Spring may not lie solely in regime durability, but in the revolutionary episode's capacity to translate its ideology into lasting institutional transformation. Curriculum transformation represents one observable manifestation of this process.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, this paper argues for the merit of neutral long-term outcome measures to improve analytical utility across the field, proposing curriculum change as one useful indicator. Second, it quantitatively advances revolutionary ideology as an explanatory factor of the divergence between revolutions.

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Appendix A - Additional Tables

Table A1

Ideology Distribution by World Region

Region	N	Leftist	Islamist	Democratic	Ethnic	Other
Asia	32	7	1	16	2	8
Europe	21	2	0	16	1	3
Latin America/Caribbean	17	9	0	6	1	3
Middle East/North Africa	26	5	5	8	10	3
Sub-Saharan Africa	38	9	0	11	23	3

Note. Full analysis sample (N = 134). Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table A2

Ideology Distribution by Historical period

Period	N	Leftist	Islamist	Democratic	Ethnic	Other
Post-1991	57	2	2	32	16	12
Pre-1991	77	30	4	25	21	8

Note. Full analysis sample (N = 134). 1991 cutoff motivated by Soviet collapse. Categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table A3

Ideology Co-occurrence Matrix

Ideology	Leftist	Islamist	Democratic	Ethnic
Leftist	32	1	3	6
Islamist	1	6	0	1
Democratic	3	0	57	8
Ethnic	6	1	8	37

Note. Full analysis sample (N = 134). Cell values = number of revolutions coded 1 on both row and column ideology type. Diagonal = total N per ideology.

Table A4
Revolutionary Ideology Regime Change frequency

Ideology type	Total N	Regime change N	Regime change %
Leftist	32	12	37.5
Islamist	6	3	50.0
Democratic	57	34	59.6
Ethnic	37	19	51.4
Other	20	9	45.0

Note. Full analysis sample (N = 134). Categories are not mutually exclusive; a revolution may be coded 1 on multiple ideology types. Regime change % = share of ideology type that achieved regime change.

Table A5*First Model: Controls for H1 Leftist and H2 Islamist*

	H1 Baseline	H1 +Central.	H1 +Log GDP	H1 Full	H2 Baseline	H2 +Central.	H2 +Log GDP	H2 Full
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.498*** (0.101)	0.509*** (0.097)	0.514*** (0.097)	0.512*** (0.093)	0.765*** (0.065)	0.762*** (0.065)	0.753*** (0.063)	0.750*** (0.063)
Leftist revolution	-0.139* (0.065)	-0.129* (0.064)	-0.134* (0.063)	-0.136* (0.066)	0.078 (0.056)	0.074 (0.054)	0.065 (0.054)	0.063 (0.056)
Islamist revolution	-0.115 (0.077)	-0.110 (0.079)	-0.114 (0.078)	-0.149+ (0.078)	0.188 (0.121)	0.180 (0.121)	0.168 (0.126)	0.166 (0.125)
Democratic revolution	-0.071+ (0.039)	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.040)	0.034 (0.029)	0.026 (0.034)	0.011 (0.035)	0.002 (0.040)
Ethnic revolution	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.027 (0.040)	-0.042 (0.045)	-0.073 (0.049)	0.075+ (0.039)	0.073+ (0.041)	0.095* (0.042)	0.098* (0.047)
Regime change	-0.107* (0.042)	-0.111** (0.042)	-0.127** (0.047)	-0.128** (0.046)	-0.002 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.035)	0.020 (0.032)	0.023 (0.032)
Ideology × Regime change	0.409*** (0.104)	0.414*** (0.104)	0.420*** (0.101)	0.396*** (0.099)	0.418* (0.197)	0.427* (0.197)	0.447* (0.179)	0.452* (0.181)
Education centralisation (pre)		-0.131+ (0.076)	-0.157* (0.079)	-0.186* (0.078)		0.051 (0.103)	0.076 (0.105)	0.083 (0.111)
Log GDP per capita (pre)			-0.027	-0.009			0.052**	0.053**

	H1 Baseline	H1 +Central.	H1 +Log GDP	H1 Full	H2 Baseline	H2 +Central.	H2 +Log GDP	H2 Full
			(0.022)	(0.021)			(0.018)	(0.018)
Log deaths				0.029*				-0.003
				(0.014)				(0.015)
Start year	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.003**	0.003**	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	133	130	134	134	133	130
R2	0.468	0.478	0.491	0.518	0.712	0.713	0.729	0.728
R2 Adj.	0.434	0.440	0.449	0.473	0.693	0.692	0.706	0.702

Note. Sequential control addition. Reference category: Other revolutions. Columns show baseline interaction, + centralisation, + log GDP per capita, + log deaths (full). Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A6*First Model: Controls for H3 Democratic and H4 Ethnic*

	H3 Baseline	H3 +Central.	H3 +Log GDP	H3 Full	H4 Baseline	H4 +Central.	H4 +Log GDP	H4 Full
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.755*** (0.094)	0.806*** (0.087)	0.810*** (0.087)	0.830*** (0.084)	0.610*** (0.135)	0.629*** (0.130)	0.632*** (0.132)	0.634*** (0.130)
Leftist revolution	0.007 (0.065)	-0.011 (0.063)	-0.007 (0.064)	0.011 (0.068)	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.038)	-0.011 (0.039)	-0.004 (0.043)
Islamist revolution	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.084+ (0.050)	-0.081 (0.050)	-0.077 (0.059)	0.150* (0.075)	0.157* (0.078)	0.157* (0.078)	0.170* (0.083)
Democratic revolution	-0.016 (0.062)	-0.060 (0.068)	-0.058 (0.068)	-0.062 (0.067)	0.012 (0.029)	0.026 (0.029)	0.029 (0.029)	0.023 (0.030)
Ethnic revolution	-0.013 (0.044)	-0.024 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.047)	-0.024 (0.053)	0.042 (0.041)	0.043 (0.042)	0.037 (0.045)	0.042 (0.048)
Regime change	0.008 (0.053)	0.008 (0.051)	0.007 (0.057)	-0.001 (0.057)	-0.030 (0.034)	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.041 (0.036)	-0.045 (0.037)
Ideology × Regime change	0.161* (0.074)	0.180* (0.073)	0.182* (0.076)	0.183* (0.077)	0.114 (0.078)	0.122 (0.081)	0.123 (0.082)	0.133 (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)		0.251*** (0.072)	0.255*** (0.072)	0.269*** (0.069)		-0.098 (0.087)	-0.106 (0.093)	-0.104 (0.097)
Log GDP per capita (pre)			-0.007	-0.007			-0.011	-0.016

	H3 Baseline	H3 +Central.	H3 +Log GDP	H3 Full	H4 Baseline	H4 +Central.	H4 +Log GDP	H4 Full
			(0.022)	(0.022)			(0.018)	(0.018)
Log deaths				-0.004				-0.009
				(0.014)				(0.012)
Start year	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	133	130	134	134	133	130
R2	0.467	0.503	0.503	0.516	0.493	0.501	0.502	0.501
R2 Adj.	0.433	0.467	0.462	0.471	0.461	0.465	0.461	0.455

Note. Sequential control addition. Reference category: Other revolutions. Columns show baseline interaction, + centralisation, + log GDP per capita, + log deaths (full). Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A7
Pre/Post 1991 Model

	H1 Pre-1991	H1 Post-1991	H2 Pre-1991	H2 Post-1991	H3 Pre-1991	H3 Post-1991	H4 Pre-1991	H4 Post-1991
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.484*** (0.115)	0.661*** (0.188)	0.699*** (0.101)	0.842*** (0.062)	0.633*** (0.150)	0.961*** (0.091)	0.437* (0.191)	0.854*** (0.064)
Leftist revolution	-0.205+ (0.110)	0.020 (0.049)	0.047 (0.057)	-0.018 (0.113)	0.027 (0.078)	-0.022 (0.097)	-0.002 (0.040)	-0.132 (0.096)
Islamist revolution	-0.128 (0.126)	-0.187 (0.134)	-0.033 (0.053)	0.549*** (0.040)	-0.147+ (0.076)	-0.034 (0.067)	0.021 (0.048)	0.327+ (0.173)
Democratic revolution	-0.127+ (0.072)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.046)	0.047 (0.034)	0.001 (0.108)	0.040 (0.054)	-0.032 (0.046)	0.019 (0.030)
Ethnic revolution	-0.071 (0.071)	0.025 (0.035)	0.050 (0.060)	0.083+ (0.047)	-0.042 (0.072)	0.034 (0.050)	0.011 (0.051)	0.012 (0.039)
Regime change	-0.158+ (0.088)	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.043 (0.047)	0.079 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.071)	-0.001 (0.071)	-0.037 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.023)
Ideology × Regime change	0.463** (0.142)	N/A	0.743*** (0.196)	-0.155+ (0.081)	0.180 (0.119)	0.089 (0.080)	0.138 (0.109)	0.097 (0.064)
Start year	-0.004+ (0.002)	0.005+ (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.009* (0.003)	0.004+ (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.003)	0.003+ (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)
Num.Obs.	77	57	77	57	77	57	77	57
R2	0.459	0.624	0.688	0.820	0.370	0.774	0.349	0.806

	H1 Pre-1991	H1 Post-1991	H2 Pre-1991	H2 Post-1991	H3 Pre-1991	H3 Post-1991	H4 Pre-1991	H4 Post-1991
R2 Adj.	0.396	0.570	0.651	0.789	0.296	0.736	0.272	0.774

Note. Pre/post 1991 split. 1991 cutoff motivated by Soviet collapse. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode. N/A = interaction not estimable due to no variation in regime change outcome for that ideology type.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.


Table A8*Standardised Scores: Effect Size Comparison Across Hypotheses*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Leftist revolution	-0.461*	0.220	0.036	-0.069
	(0.217)	(0.156)	(0.311)	(0.166)
Islamist revolution	-0.383	0.529	-0.389	0.642*
	(0.255)	(0.340)	(0.253)	(0.320)
Democratic revolution	-0.235+	0.096	-0.075	0.050
	(0.129)	(0.082)	(0.300)	(0.122)
Ethnic revolution	-0.111	0.211+	-0.064	0.181
	(0.133)	(0.110)	(0.210)	(0.176)
Regime change	-0.355*	-0.007	0.037	-0.128
	(0.138)	(0.099)	(0.254)	(0.147)
Ideology × Regime change	1.362***	1.174*	0.775*	0.488
	(0.347)	(0.553)	(0.358)	(0.335)
Start year	-0.005	0.009**	-0.001	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Num.Obs.	134	134	134	134
R2	0.468	0.712	0.467	0.493
R2 Adj.	0.434	0.693	0.433	0.461

Note. Standardised scores. DVs divided by pre-revolutionary SD to allow direct comparison of effect sizes across hypotheses. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure A1
Predicted Post-Revolutionary Curriculum Content



Note. Predicted post-revolutionary curriculum content by ideology type and regime change outcome. All four hypotheses shown. Primary specification with full controls (N=130). Controls held at sample means. Error bars = 95% confidence

Table A9*Predicted Post-Revolutionary Curriculum by Ideology and Regime Change Outcome*

DV	Scenario	Predicted	CI lower	CI upper
H1: Leftist	No regime change	0.096	0.036	0.156
	Regime change	0.364	0.190	0.538
	Non-Leftist, regime change	0.104	0.023	0.184
	Difference (regime change – no regime change)	0.268		
H2: Islamist*	No regime change	0.353	0.118	0.588
	Regime change	0.828	0.585	1.070
	Non-Islamist, regime change	0.210	0.143	0.276
	Difference (regime change – no regime change)	0.475		
H3: Democrat	No regime change	0.212	0.138	0.285
	Regime change	0.394	0.318	0.470
	Non-Democratic, regime change	0.273	0.174	0.372
	Difference (regime change – no regime change)	0.182		
H4: Ethnic	No regime change	0.133	0.066	0.200
	Regime change	0.221	0.101	0.341
	Non-Ethnic, regime change	0.047	-0.026	0.120
	Difference (regime change – no regime change)	0.088		

Note. Predicted values from primary specification. Controls held at full sample means. Reference category: Other revolutions. Difference = regime change minus no regime change for ideology group.

Table A10*Alternative Explanation: Education Centralisation Interaction*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.527*** (0.109)	0.781*** (0.066)	0.878*** (0.088)	0.635*** (0.134)
Leftist revolution	0.004 (0.159)	0.089 (0.060)	0.007 (0.069)	-0.007 (0.036)
Islamist revolution	-0.060 (0.072)	0.336 (0.366)	-0.069 (0.060)	0.147* (0.073)
Democratic revolution	-0.043 (0.037)	0.028 (0.034)	-0.078 (0.094)	0.019 (0.032)
Ethnic revolution	-0.010 (0.038)	0.063 (0.040)	-0.018 (0.047)	0.152 (0.203)
Regime change	-0.018 (0.043)	0.020 (0.036)	0.091* (0.040)	0.001 (0.034)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.132 (0.081)	0.030 (0.106)	0.182+ (0.100)	-0.065 (0.070)
Ideology × Centralisation	0.072 (0.241)	0.098 (0.653)	0.183 (0.175)	-0.078 (0.301)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001+ (0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	134	134
R2	0.376	0.698	0.482	0.488
R2 Adj.	0.331	0.676	0.445	0.450

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A11*Alternative Explanation: Log GDP Per Capita Interactions*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.484*** (0.110)	0.781*** (0.064)	0.820*** (0.092)	0.607*** (0.144)
Leftist revolution	0.437** (0.158)	0.083 (0.059)	0.015 (0.067)	-0.011 (0.038)
Islamist revolution	-0.018 (0.072)	0.251 (0.314)	-0.071 (0.059)	0.136* (0.068)
Democratic revolution	-0.050 (0.039)	0.022 (0.030)	0.038 (0.113)	0.007 (0.026)
Ethnic revolution	-0.006 (0.043)	0.086* (0.040)	-0.016 (0.048)	0.050 (0.106)
Regime change	-0.033 (0.042)	0.037 (0.034)	0.072+ (0.042)	0.000 (0.030)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	0.017 (0.024)	0.047* (0.018)	-0.011 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.022)
Ideology × Log GDP	-0.195** (0.058)	0.070 (0.188)	0.017 (0.044)	0.023 (0.047)
Start year	-0.002+ (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	133	133	133	133
R2	0.444	0.713	0.448	0.482
R2 Adj.	0.404	0.691	0.407	0.444

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 133). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table A12*Alternative Explanation: Log Deaths (Violence) Interactions*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.506*** (0.108)	0.787*** (0.065)	0.850*** (0.080)	0.628*** (0.132)
Leftist revolution	-0.074 (0.111)	0.091 (0.063)	0.032 (0.070)	-0.000 (0.039)
Islamist revolution	-0.092 (0.073)	0.590+ (0.347)	-0.079 (0.071)	0.168* (0.079)
Democratic revolution	-0.031 (0.035)	0.021 (0.030)	0.173** (0.057)	0.008 (0.026)
Ethnic revolution	-0.049 (0.049)	0.071 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.054)	0.017 (0.080)
Regime change	-0.032 (0.041)	0.023 (0.037)	0.065+ (0.037)	-0.002 (0.030)
Log deaths	0.022 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.012 (0.013)
× Log deaths	0.032 (0.035)	-0.045 (0.071)	-0.042+ (0.023)	0.027 (0.026)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	131	131	131	131
R2	0.414	0.698	0.470	0.484
R2 Adj.	0.371	0.675	0.431	0.446

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 131). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Appendix B - Robustness Tests

Table B1
Region Fixed Effects

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.531*** (0.097)	0.690*** (0.073)	0.784*** (0.086)	0.628*** (0.120)
Leftist revolution	-0.137+ (0.071)	0.076 (0.054)	0.003 (0.064)	0.009 (0.043)
Islamist revolution	-0.227** (0.084)	0.024 (0.140)	-0.007 (0.054)	0.112 (0.075)
Democratic revolution	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.042)	-0.088 (0.065)	0.025 (0.028)
Ethnic revolution	-0.061 (0.048)	0.086+ (0.051)	-0.048 (0.066)	0.057 (0.051)
Regime change	-0.130** (0.046)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.033)
Ideology × Regime change	0.432*** (0.112)	0.524** (0.170)	0.200** (0.076)	0.141+ (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.171* (0.075)	0.124 (0.107)	0.229*** (0.066)	-0.091 (0.102)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.042 (0.028)	0.046* (0.022)	0.022 (0.034)	-0.053* (0.022)
Log deaths	0.028+ (0.015)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.012)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001+ (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.542	0.759	0.575	0.527
R2 Adj.	0.481	0.728	0.519	0.464

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
<i>Note.</i> Region fixed effects added to primary specification. Region dummies absorb time-invariant regional variation. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 130). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.				

Table B2
Decade Fixed Effects

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.581*** (0.086)	0.757*** (0.061)	0.855*** (0.078)	0.632*** (0.124)
Leftist revolution	-0.109 (0.071)	0.089 (0.065)	0.031 (0.073)	0.016 (0.046)
Islamist revolution	-0.162+ (0.083)	0.226+ (0.126)	-0.125+ (0.074)	0.168+ (0.087)
Democratic revolution	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.011 (0.038)	-0.025 (0.066)	0.015 (0.031)
Ethnic revolution	-0.083 (0.051)	0.107* (0.047)	-0.030 (0.052)	0.032 (0.051)
Regime change	-0.098* (0.045)	0.011 (0.034)	0.009 (0.056)	-0.058 (0.037)
Ideology × Regime change	0.324** (0.099)	0.474* (0.189)	0.148+ (0.075)	0.153+ (0.087)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.099 (0.083)	0.086 (0.105)	0.228* (0.088)	-0.140 (0.095)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.020 (0.022)	0.040* (0.019)	0.002 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.018)
Log deaths	0.033* (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.013)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.554	0.751	0.558	0.528
R2 Adj.	0.491	0.716	0.495	0.461

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
<i>Note.</i> Decade fixed effects replace startyear continuous control. Absorbs within-decade global curriculum trends. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode. + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.				

Table B3
Revolutionary Ideology and Pre-Revolutionary Curriculum Content

	Pre-socialist	Pre-religious	Pre-democratic	Pre-ethnic
Leftist revolution	-0.114 (0.074)	0.055 (0.088)	-0.044 (0.050)	0.112+ (0.058)
Islamist revolution	0.156 (0.129)	-0.041 (0.153)	-0.218* (0.087)	-0.021 (0.101)
Democratic revolution	0.074 (0.062)	-0.123+ (0.074)	-0.046 (0.042)	-0.020 (0.049)
Ethnic revolution	0.031 (0.062)	0.090 (0.073)	-0.057 (0.042)	0.060 (0.048)
Start year	-0.003+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002+ (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	134	134	134	134
R2	0.055	0.056	0.092	0.049
R2 Adj.	0.019	0.019	0.057	0.011

Note. Pre-treatment Check: does revolutionary ideology predict pre-revolutionary curriculum content?
Significant coefficients would suggest selection bias. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134).
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B4
Fractional Logit

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	4.339*** (0.540)	4.880*** (0.581)	4.296*** (0.520)	4.863*** (0.670)
Leftist revolution	-1.127 (0.726)	0.876* (0.417)	0.135 (0.440)	0.052 (0.527)
Islamist revolution	-0.952 (0.606)	1.625* (0.697)	-1.465+ (0.787)	2.088*** (0.608)
Democratic revolution	-0.429 (0.617)	0.006 (0.456)	-0.407 (0.419)	0.349 (0.362)
Ethnic revolution	-0.912+ (0.526)	1.107** (0.401)	-0.100 (0.335)	0.535 (0.415)
Regime change	-1.467* (0.567)	0.308 (0.284)	0.002 (0.401)	-0.873 (0.594)
Ideology × Regime change	3.818*** (0.883)	17.046*** (1.145)	1.039* (0.484)	1.620* (0.756)
Education centralisation (pre)	-2.298* (0.955)	0.429 (1.140)	1.726*** (0.418)	-1.320 (1.306)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	0.001 (0.256)	0.536* (0.205)	-0.029 (0.124)	-0.411* (0.187)
Log deaths	0.327 (0.201)	0.042 (0.153)	-0.023 (0.089)	-0.110 (0.126)
Start year	-0.009 (0.015)	0.040*** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.014 (0.009)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130

Note. Fractional logit (quasibinomial) robustness check. Appropriate for bounded 0-1 dependent variables. Coefficients are log-odds. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 130). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B5
Change Score Dependent Variable

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	-0.488*** (0.093)	-0.250*** (0.063)	-0.170* (0.084)	-0.366** (0.130)
Leftist revolution	-0.136* (0.066)	0.063 (0.056)	0.011 (0.068)	-0.004 (0.043)
Islamist revolution	-0.149+ (0.078)	0.166 (0.125)	-0.077 (0.059)	0.170* (0.083)
Democratic revolution	-0.021 (0.040)	0.002 (0.040)	-0.062 (0.067)	0.023 (0.030)
Ethnic revolution	-0.073 (0.049)	0.098* (0.047)	-0.024 (0.053)	0.042 (0.048)
Regime change	-0.128** (0.046)	0.023 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.057)	-0.045 (0.037)
Ideology × Regime change	0.396*** (0.099)	0.452* (0.181)	0.183* (0.077)	0.133 (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.186* (0.078)	0.083 (0.111)	0.269*** (0.069)	-0.104 (0.097)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.009 (0.021)	0.053** (0.018)	-0.007 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.018)
Log deaths	0.029* (0.014)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.509	0.352	0.206	0.317
R2 Adj.	0.463	0.291	0.132	0.254

Note. Change score DV (post-mean minus pre-mean). Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B6*Window Robustness: 5-Year Post Window*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.537*** (0.096)	0.759*** (0.063)	0.834*** (0.084)	0.636*** (0.131)
Leftist revolution	-0.119+ (0.067)	0.053 (0.055)	0.012 (0.068)	-0.005 (0.042)
Islamist revolution	-0.121 (0.085)	0.104 (0.087)	-0.082 (0.057)	0.131* (0.061)
Democratic revolution	-0.017 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.039)	-0.061 (0.066)	0.023 (0.029)
Ethnic revolution	-0.065 (0.050)	0.079+ (0.043)	-0.027 (0.053)	0.030 (0.044)
Regime change	-0.130** (0.046)	0.020 (0.032)	0.004 (0.057)	-0.044 (0.036)
Ideology × Regime change	0.403*** (0.101)	0.505** (0.162)	0.184* (0.076)	0.131 (0.082)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.198* (0.078)	0.095 (0.110)	0.255*** (0.069)	-0.106 (0.096)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.014 (0.022)	0.056** (0.018)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.015 (0.017)
Log deaths	0.027+ (0.014)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.012)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.528	0.739	0.524	0.504
R2 Adj.	0.484	0.714	0.480	0.458

H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
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Note. Post-revolutionary window sensitivity check. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table B7
Window Robustness: 10-Year Post Window

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.445*** (0.088)	0.734*** (0.068)	0.815*** (0.096)	0.573*** (0.149)
Leftist revolution	-0.147* (0.068)	0.065 (0.059)	0.019 (0.068)	-0.001 (0.044)
Islamist revolution	-0.153+ (0.082)	0.209 (0.158)	-0.079 (0.064)	0.198+ (0.104)
Democratic revolution	-0.034 (0.048)	0.004 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.078)	0.014 (0.032)
Ethnic revolution	-0.084 (0.053)	0.108+ (0.055)	-0.017 (0.056)	0.032 (0.052)
Regime change	-0.123* (0.047)	0.017 (0.035)	0.010 (0.062)	-0.041 (0.039)
Ideology × Regime change	0.388*** (0.100)	0.423* (0.206)	0.155+ (0.087)	0.135 (0.088)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.178* (0.089)	0.063 (0.137)	0.287*** (0.079)	-0.099 (0.112)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.015 (0.024)	0.046* (0.020)	0.003 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.019)
Log deaths	0.024+ (0.014)	-0.006 (0.017)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.013)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002+ (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	120	120	120	120
R2	0.481	0.700	0.483	0.433
R2 Adj.	0.428	0.669	0.430	0.375

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B8
Window Robustness: 15-Year Post Window

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.381*** (0.083)	0.686*** (0.075)	0.716*** (0.117)	0.533*** (0.157)
Leftist revolution	-0.175* (0.076)	0.058 (0.061)	0.031 (0.069)	0.002 (0.047)
Islamist revolution	-0.152+ (0.087)	0.205 (0.164)	-0.108 (0.076)	0.218* (0.110)
Democratic revolution	-0.062 (0.058)	-0.065 (0.052)	0.007 (0.106)	-0.000 (0.041)
Ethnic revolution	-0.113+ (0.057)	0.163* (0.063)	-0.006 (0.061)	0.074 (0.070)
Regime change	-0.153* (0.063)	-0.003 (0.036)	0.017 (0.069)	-0.051 (0.048)
Ideology × Regime change	0.407*** (0.110)	0.504* (0.194)	0.147 (0.111)	0.097 (0.102)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.161 (0.104)	0.186 (0.123)	0.245** (0.086)	-0.081 (0.135)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.038 (0.030)	0.031 (0.025)	0.030 (0.032)	-0.039 (0.026)
Log deaths	0.011 (0.015)	-0.029+ (0.016)	0.015 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.017)
Start year	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	103	103	103	103
R2	0.458	0.706	0.446	0.404
R2 Adj.	0.392	0.671	0.378	0.332

Note. Post-revolutionary window sensitivity check. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table B9*Window Robustness: 20-Year Post Window*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.377*** (0.083)	0.655*** (0.083)	0.645*** (0.127)	0.520** (0.161)
Leftist revolution	-0.158* (0.076)	0.014 (0.055)	0.024 (0.072)	0.025 (0.051)
Islamist revolution	-0.130 (0.090)	0.278 (0.178)	-0.151+ (0.086)	0.211+ (0.117)
Democratic revolution	-0.048 (0.056)	-0.110* (0.047)	0.014 (0.119)	0.009 (0.049)
Ethnic revolution	-0.110+ (0.058)	0.147** (0.054)	-0.030 (0.064)	0.082 (0.081)
Regime change	-0.128+ (0.070)	0.003 (0.040)	-0.004 (0.076)	-0.066 (0.059)
Ideology $\times$ Regime change	0.339** (0.104)	0.457* (0.214)	0.105 (0.128)	0.118 (0.122)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.189 (0.139)	0.333* (0.147)	0.268* (0.109)	-0.159 (0.175)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.037 (0.029)	0.016 (0.024)	0.058+ (0.035)	-0.041 (0.032)
Log deaths	0.019 (0.015)	-0.027+ (0.015)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.021)
Start year	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Num.Obs.	88	88	88	88
R2	0.464	0.756	0.478	0.417
R2 Adj.	0.386	0.720	0.402	0.332

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
<i>Note.</i> 20-year post window. Post-revolutionary window sensitivity check. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.				
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.				

Table B10
Revolutions that achieved Regime Change Subsample

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.244** (0.088)	0.626*** (0.109)	0.861*** (0.123)	0.379+ (0.196)
Leftist revolution	0.294*** (0.082)	-0.023 (0.092)	0.151+ (0.087)	-0.062 (0.078)
Islamist revolution	-0.230** (0.082)	0.649*** (0.148)	-0.066 (0.114)	0.092 (0.068)
Democratic revolution	-0.064 (0.040)	-0.029 (0.061)	0.121* (0.059)	0.019 (0.045)
Ethnic revolution	-0.071 (0.068)	0.125 (0.089)	-0.006 (0.072)	0.158* (0.075)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.167 (0.101)	0.110 (0.167)	0.305** (0.098)	-0.145 (0.151)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.034 (0.027)	0.062* (0.023)	0.008 (0.043)	-0.023 (0.032)
Log deaths	0.007 (0.015)	0.001 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.020)	0.006 (0.019)
Start year	0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	67	67	67	67
R2	0.495	0.676	0.532	0.339
R2 Adj.	0.415	0.625	0.458	0.234

Note. Revolutions that achieved regime change (N = 67). Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B11*Full specification Model with alternative Violence Control: Armed Revolution*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.513*** (0.098)	0.755*** (0.063)	0.827*** (0.087)	0.630*** (0.131)
Leftist revolution	-0.137* (0.066)	0.054 (0.053)	-0.016 (0.063)	-0.005 (0.041)
Islamist revolution	-0.116 (0.078)	0.173 (0.128)	-0.083 (0.051)	0.160* (0.080)
Democratic revolution	-0.042 (0.042)	0.037 (0.054)	-0.036 (0.072)	0.019 (0.031)
Ethnic revolution	-0.046 (0.048)	0.078 (0.049)	-0.036 (0.046)	0.043 (0.046)
Regime change	-0.127** (0.047)	0.020 (0.032)	0.008 (0.057)	-0.041 (0.036)
Ideology × Regime change	0.418*** (0.102)	0.424* (0.190)	0.177* (0.076)	0.125 (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.161+ (0.082)	0.059 (0.116)	0.246** (0.073)	-0.099 (0.095)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.026 (0.022)	0.055** (0.018)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.018)
Armed revolution	0.014 (0.047)	0.056 (0.070)	0.042 (0.045)	-0.022 (0.035)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	133	133	133	133
R2	0.491	0.732	0.506	0.503
R2 Adj.	0.445	0.707	0.461	0.458

Note. Armed revolution dummy replaces log deaths as violence control. Armed = 1 if revolution used armed tactics. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 133). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B12*Primary Specification Model Without Pre-Revolutionary Curriculum Baseline*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Leftist revolution	-0.239** (0.089)	0.092 (0.089)	-0.015 (0.072)	0.059 (0.057)
Islamist revolution	-0.093 (0.133)	-0.065 (0.122)	-0.227*** (0.057)	0.145+ (0.085)
Democratic revolution	0.021 (0.054)	-0.123 (0.083)	-0.181* (0.081)	-0.010 (0.054)
Ethnic revolution	-0.068 (0.060)	0.160* (0.080)	-0.040 (0.059)	0.057 (0.082)
Regime change	-0.176** (0.055)	0.076 (0.064)	-0.067 (0.069)	-0.037 (0.039)
Ideology × Regime change	0.430*** (0.121)	0.806*** (0.154)	0.338*** (0.090)	0.162 (0.112)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.103 (0.105)	0.212 (0.142)	0.114 (0.109)	0.045 (0.119)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	0.014 (0.024)	0.078* (0.033)	-0.004 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.028)
Log deaths	0.041* (0.017)	0.003 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)
Start year	-0.003+ (0.002)	0.003+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.229	0.224	0.195	0.114
R2 Adj.	0.164	0.159	0.128	0.040

Note. Tests robustness of findings to omission of baseline control. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 130). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B13
Main Specification Excluding Influential Observations

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.531*** (0.106)	0.727*** (0.067)	0.845*** (0.086)	0.626*** (0.131)
Leftist revolution	-0.140* (0.069)	0.071 (0.059)	-0.025 (0.068)	-0.023 (0.048)
Islamist revolution	-0.185* (0.078)	0.163 (0.125)	-0.088 (0.061)	0.215* (0.086)
Democratic revolution	-0.027 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.070 (0.072)	0.020 (0.031)
Ethnic revolution	-0.096+ (0.049)	0.095+ (0.049)	-0.033 (0.053)	0.033 (0.050)
Regime change	-0.119** (0.045)	0.032 (0.034)	-0.007 (0.061)	-0.064 (0.041)
Ideology × Regime change	0.376*** (0.098)	0.449* (0.177)	0.176* (0.078)	0.177+ (0.095)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.143+ (0.081)	0.088 (0.112)	0.265*** (0.071)	-0.118 (0.107)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.009 (0.022)	0.053** (0.018)	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.017 (0.019)
Log deaths	0.042** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.013)
Start year	-0.000 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	117	123	123	118
R2	0.529	0.712	0.520	0.509
R2 Adj.	0.480	0.683	0.473	0.458

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
<i>Note.</i> Primary specification excluding influential observations (Cook's $D > 4/N = 0.03$). Each hypothesis excludes its own influential observations. N per hypothesis: H1 = 117, H2 = 123, H3 = 123, H4 = 118. Reference category: Other revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode. + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.				

Table B14*Main Specification Excluding Islamist Revolutions*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.504*** (0.093)	0.759*** (0.069)	0.846*** (0.081)	0.629*** (0.133)
Leftist revolution	-0.113+ (0.061)	0.035 (0.063)	0.020 (0.065)	-0.022 (0.042)
Democratic revolution	-0.005 (0.039)	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.053 (0.063)	0.006 (0.031)
Ethnic revolution	-0.058 (0.046)	0.046 (0.049)	-0.016 (0.048)	0.034 (0.051)
Regime change	-0.126** (0.046)	0.048 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.058)	-0.037 (0.036)
Ideology $\times$ Regime change	0.379*** (0.099)		0.181* (0.077)	0.114 (0.086)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.188* (0.078)	0.073 (0.117)	0.270*** (0.069)	-0.096 (0.098)
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.012 (0.022)	0.061** (0.023)	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.012 (0.018)
Log deaths	0.025+ (0.014)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.011)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130
R2	0.506	0.665	0.513	0.480

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
R2 Adj.	0.465	0.640	0.472	0.436

Note. Islamist revolution dummy excluded from all models. Islamist revolutions (N = 6) absorbed into Other reference category. Full analysis sample (N = 134). Reference category: Other + Islamist revolutions. SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B15*Main Specification with Incumbent Regime Type for Democratic and Leftist*

	H1 + Communist	H1 + Democratic	H2 + Communist	H2 + Democratic	H3 + Communist	H3 + Democratic	H4 + Communist	H4 + Democratic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.519*** (0.114)	0.512*** (0.093)	0.746*** (0.063)	0.748*** (0.064)	0.846*** (0.088)	0.812*** (0.094)	0.635*** (0.130)	0.634*** (0.130)
Leftist revolution	-0.136* (0.064)	-0.129+ (0.066)	0.045 (0.055)	0.065 (0.057)	0.028 (0.071)	0.009 (0.068)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.005 (0.043)
Islamist revolution	-0.149+ (0.080)	-0.157+ (0.080)	0.150 (0.133)	0.161 (0.127)	-0.082 (0.060)	-0.073 (0.059)	0.169* (0.084)	0.171* (0.084)
Democratic revolution	-0.020 (0.041)	-0.034 (0.043)	0.012 (0.041)	-0.005 (0.042)	-0.075 (0.066)	-0.054 (0.068)	0.022 (0.030)	0.025 (0.033)
Ethnic revolution	-0.075+ (0.045)	-0.076 (0.049)	0.087+ (0.047)	0.096* (0.048)	-0.012 (0.056)	-0.022 (0.053)	0.043 (0.049)	0.042 (0.048)
Regime change	-0.127** (0.047)	-0.128** (0.046)	0.017 (0.032)	0.022 (0.033)	0.001 (0.059)	-0.000 (0.058)	-0.044 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.037)
Ideology × Regime change	0.395*** (0.101)	0.386*** (0.101)	0.502** (0.185)	0.453* (0.181)	0.187* (0.077)	0.187* (0.078)	0.132 (0.083)	0.132 (0.083)
Education centralisation (pre)	-0.186* (0.081)	-0.204* (0.082)	0.097 (0.110)	0.074 (0.115)	0.261*** (0.071)	0.281*** (0.069)	-0.105 (0.098)	-0.102 (0.102)

	H1 + Communist	H1 + Democratic	H2 + Communist	H2 + Democratic	H3 + Communist	H3 + Democratic	H4 + Communist	H4 + Democratic
Log GDP per capita (pre)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.021)	0.055** (0.018)	0.054** (0.019)	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)
Log deaths	0.029* (0.014)	0.026+ (0.014)	-0.001 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)
Communist incumbent regime	-0.015 (0.166)		-0.110** (0.035)		0.107+ (0.064)		0.011 (0.029)	
Democratic incumbent regime		-0.054 (0.044)		-0.028 (0.050)		0.047 (0.055)		0.008 (0.042)
Start year	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002+ (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	130	130	130	130	130	130	130	130
R2	0.518	0.521	0.733	0.728	0.526	0.518	0.501	0.501
R2 Adj.	0.469	0.472	0.706	0.700	0.477	0.469	0.450	0.450

Note. Reference category: Other revolutions. Full analysis sample (N = 134). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B16
Second Model Robustness Check

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.522*** (0.114)	0.787*** (0.074)	0.839*** (0.093)	0.609*** (0.150)
Leftist revolution	0.081 (0.055)	0.072 (0.068)		
Islamist revolution	-0.023 (0.065)	0.371** (0.131)		
Democratic revolution			0.080 (0.053)	-0.015 (0.038)
Ethnic revolution			-0.002 (0.044)	0.084+ (0.046)
Regime change	-0.012 (0.045)	0.013 (0.042)	0.101** (0.037)	0.005 (0.036)
Start year	-0.002 (0.001)	0.004* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	114	114	114	114
R2	0.411	0.668	0.485	0.453
R2 Adj.	0.384	0.653	0.461	0.427

Note. H1/H2: reference = democratic + ethnic revolutions. H3/H4: reference = leftist + islamist revolutions. Primary sample (N = 114). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Table B17
*Second Model Robustness Check * Regime Interaction*

	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	0.499*** (0.101)	0.768*** (0.076)	0.791*** (0.098)	0.602*** (0.149)
Leftist revolution	-0.099* (0.046)	0.052 (0.061)		
Islamist revolution	-0.070 (0.074)	0.163 (0.140)		
Democratic revolution			0.015 (0.051)	-0.012 (0.039)
Ethnic revolution			0.001 (0.044)	0.028 (0.046)
Regime change	-0.126** (0.042)	-0.011 (0.041)	0.038 (0.055)	-0.032 (0.039)
Ideology × Regime change	0.413*** (0.105)	0.408+ (0.218)	0.128+ (0.077)	0.112 (0.083)
Start year	-0.002+ (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Num.Obs.	114	114	114	114
R2	0.523	0.684	0.498	0.465
R2 Adj.	0.497	0.666	0.470	0.435

Note. H1/H2: reference = democratic + ethnic revolutions. H3/H4: reference = leftist + islamist revolutions. Primary sample (N = 114). SEs clustered by revolutionary episode.

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Appendix C - OLS Assumptions Checks

Table C1
Variance Inflation Factors

Variable	H1: Socialist	H2: Religious	H3: Democratic	H4: Ethnic
Pre-rev. curriculum (baseline)	1.13	1.08	1.22	1.13
Leftist revolution	2.48	2.14	3.57	2.33
Regime change	1.49	1.16	2.35	1.75
Islamist revolution	1.08	1.53	1.31	2.47
Education centralisation (pre)	1.09	1.08	1.19	1.19
Log GDP per capita (pre)	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
Log deaths	1.42	1.47	2.00	2.02
Start year	1.57	1.54	1.41	1.38
× Regime change	2.12	2.19	3.96	2.72

Note. Variance inflation factors from primary specification (Table 5)

Table C2
Breusch-Pagan Heteroscedasticity Test

Hypothesis	BP statistic	p-value
H1: Socialist	44.439	0.000
H2: Religious	13.905	0.238
H3: Democratic	12.655	0.316
H4: Ethnic	29.085	0.002

Note. Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. H0: homoskedastic errors. Significant p-value indicates heteroskedasticity. Clustered standard errors used throughout analysis.

Table C3*Ramsey RESET Functional Form Test*

Hypothesis	F statistic	p-value
H1: Socialist	7.166	0.001
H2: Religious	6.468	0.002
H3: Democratic	0.451	0.638
H4: Ethnic	3.523	0.033

Note. Ramsey RESET test for functional form misspecification.


Figure C1*Residual vs. fitted plot*

Figure C2
Q-Q Plot




Figure C3*Cook's Distance - Influential Outliers*